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Abstract
Few micronance-funded businesses grow beyond subsistence entrepreneur-
ship. This paper considers one possible explanation: that the structure of
existing micronance contracts may discourage risky but high-expected return
investments. To explore this possibility, I develop a theory that unies mod-
els of investment choice, informal risk sharing, and formal nancial contracts.
I then test the predictions of this theory using a series of experiments with
clients of a large micronance institution in India. The experiments conrm
the theoretical predictions that joint liability creates two potential ine¢ ciencies.
First, borrowers free-ride on their partners, making risky investments without
compensating partners for this risk. Second, the addition of peer-monitoring
overcompensates, leading to sharp reductions in risk-taking and protability.
Equity-like nancing, in which partners share both the benets and risks of
more protable projects, overcomes both of these ine¢ ciencies and merits fur-
ther testing in the eld.
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nance, experiment.
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1 Introduction
In 2005, designated the International Year of Microcreditby the United Nations,
micronance institutions around the world issued approximately 110 million loans
with an average size of $340. The following year, Muhammad Yunus and Grameen
Bank received the Nobel Peace Prize for their e¤orts to eliminate poverty through mi-
crocredit. But while the provision of small, uncollateralized loans to poor borrowers in
poor countries may help alleviate poverty, there is little evidence that micronance-
funded businesses grow beyond subsistence entrepreneurship. Few hire employees
outside their immediate families, formalize, or generate sustained capital growth.
This paper considers one possible explanation for this phenomenon: the structure
of existing micronance contracts themselves may discourage risky but high-expected
return investments. Typical micronance contracts produce a tension between mecha-
nisms that tend to reduce risk-taking, such as peer monitoring, and those that tend to
encourage risk-taking, such as risk-pooling. Much of the theoretical literature has fo-
cused on joint liability, a common feature in most micronance programs, as a means
to induce peer monitoring and mitigate ex ante moral hazard over investment choice
(e.g., Stiglitz 1990, Varian 1990, Armendariz and Morduch 2005, Conning 2005). Un-
der joint liability, small groups of borrowers are responsible for one anothers loans.
If one member fails to repay, all members su¤er the default consequences.
While this mechanism has been widely credited with making it possible, indeed
protable, to lend to poor borrowers in poor countries, a growing literature critically
explores the relative merits of joint versus individual liability.1 There have long
been suspicions that peer monitoring may overcompensate and produce too little risk
relative to the social optimum (Banerjee, Besley, and Guinnane 1994). In particular,
joint liability compels an individual to bear the cost of her partners project when it
fails but does not mandate a compensating transfer upon success. This creates an
1When all decisions are taken cooperatively (Ghatak and Guinnane 1999) or when binding ex
ante side contracts are feasible (Rai and Sjöström 2004) these mechanisms are identical; however,
joint liability lending is most prevalent in settings where binding, complete contracts are not feasible.
Madajewicz (2003, 2004) compares individual and group lending directly, focusing on monitoring
costs and the relationship between available loan size and borrower wealth, but this basic comparison
is di¢ cult to make empirically. In practice, variation in loan types is likely the product of selection
on unobserved characteristics by either the borrower or the lender. Giné and Karlan (2011) overcome
this limitation with a large, natural eld experiment that randomly assigned individuals into joint
and individual liability loan contracts. They nd no impact of joint liability on repayment rates
and some evidence that individual liability centers generated fewer dropouts and more new clients.
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incentive to discourage risk-taking by others and thus joint liability may blunt the
entrepreneurial tendencies of borrowers.
At the same time, joint liability induces risk-pooling not only does the threat of
common default induce income transfers to members su¤ering negative shocks, but
the repeated interactions of micronance borrowers are a natural environment for
the emergence of informal risk sharing. This risk-pooling may increase borrowers
willingness to take risk themselves. Moreover, the ability to share risk informally
allows borrowers whose risky projects succeed to compensate their partners for the
implicit insurance provided by joint liability. In doing so, it can mitigate the incen-
tives to discourage risk-taking. It is therefore critical to evaluate formal contracts in
an environment where informal risk sharing is possible.
To shed light on how micronance contracts a¤ect investment choices, this paper
develops a theoretical framework that unies models of investment choice, informal
risk-sharing with limited commitment, and formal nancial contracts in order to
illustrate a range of theoretical e¤ects and motivate a series of empirical tests. It
then implements a corresponding experiment with actual micronance clients in India.
The theoretical framework builds on a simple model of informal risk-sharing in
the spirit of Coate and Ravallion (1993) and Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2002).2
In this model, two risk-averse individuals receive a series of income draws subject
to idiosyncratic shocks. In the absence of formal insurance and savings, they enter
into an informal risk-sharing arrangement that is sustained by the expectation of
future reciprocity. I enrich this model by endogenizing the income process, allowing
agents to optimize their investment choices in response to the insurance environment.
Contrary to much of the static investment choice literature in micronance, in this
model risky projects generate higher expected returns than safe projects, reecting
the natural assumption that individuals must be compensated for additional risk with
additional returns.3 On this framework I then overlay formal nancial contracts. I
2An extensive empirical literature documents the importance of informal insurance arrangements
as a risk management tool for those who lack access to formal insurance markets (e.g., Townsend
1994, Udry 1994, Foster and Rosenzweig 2001, Fafchamps and Lund 2003, Fernando 2006). Taken as
a whole, the empirical evidence suggests that informal risk coping strategies do not achieve full risk
pooling even though in some cases they perform remarkably well. This paper adds to an emerging
experimental literature (Barr and Genicot 2008, Robinson 2008, Charness and Genicot 2009) that
uses the precise control possible in an experimental setting to understand how such mechanisms
work in practice.
3Following Stiglitz (1990), most theoretical work in micronance has assumed that riskier invest-
ments represent at best a mean-preserving spread of the safer choice and often generated a lower
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consider in turn individual liability, joint liability, and an equity-like contract in which
all investment returns are shared equally.
The model illustrates two opposing inuences of joint liability on investment
choice. Mandatory transfers from ones partner encourage greater risk-taking by
partially insuring against default. Risk-taking borrowers may compensate their part-
ners for this insurance with increased transfers when risky projects succeed, or they
may free-ride,forcing their partners to insure against default without compensating
transfers. The parallel need to provide this insurance counters the risk-encouragement
e¤ect of receiving it, and relatively risk-averse individuals may elect safer investments
to avoid joint default should their partnersprojects fail.
The theoretical analysis also produces two important supporting results. First, it
demonstrates that joint liability contracts may crowd out informal insurance. By ef-
fectively mandating income transfers to assist loan repayment, joint liability eases the
sting of punishment and can make cooperation harder to sustain. Second, informal
insurance tends to increase risk-taking. Contrary to standard risk-sharing models,
this has the surprising implication that we may nd more informal insurance among
risk-tolerant individuals whose willingness to take riskier investments expands their
scope for cooperation.
While these models o¤er useful insights, in the context of repeated interactions
they produce a multiplicity of equilibria, and theory alone can provide only partial
guidance regarding the likely consequences of informal insurance and formal contracts
for investment behavior. To shed further light on these questions, I conducted a series
of experiments with actual micronance clients in India. The experiments capture the
key elements of the theoretical framework and the micronance investment decisions
it represents. Based on extensive piloting, I designed the games to be easily un-
derstood by typical micronance clients project choices and payo¤s were presented
visually, all randomizing devices used common items and familiar mechanisms (e.g.,
guessing which of an experimenters hands held a colored stone), and game money
was physical and conrmed understanding at numerous points throughout the ex-
periment. Individuals were matched in pairs that dissolved at the end of each round
with a 25% probability in order to simulate a discrete-time, innite-horizon model
with discounting. In each round, subjects could use the proceeds of a loanto invest
expected return. Examples include Morduch (1999), Ghatak and Guinnane (1999), and de Aghion
and Gollier (2000).
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in one of several projects that varied according to risk and expected returns. Returns
were determined through a simple randomizing device, after which individuals could
engage in informal risk-sharing by transferring income to their partners. In order to
play in future rounds, subjects needed to repay their loans according to the terms of
a formal nancial contract, which I varied across treatments.
I considered ve contracts: autarky, individual liability, joint liability, joint lia-
bility with a project approval requirement, and an equity-like contract in which all
income was shared equally. Much of the micronance literature assumes a local
information advantage; therefore, to test the role of information, I conducted each
of the treatments under both perfect monitoring, where all actions and outcomes
were observable, and imperfect public monitoring, where individuals observed only
whether their partner earned su¢ cient income to repay her loan. At the end of the
experiment, one period was randomly selected for cash payment.4
A laboratory-like experiment allows precise manipulation of contracts, informa-
tion, and investment returns to a degree that would be impractical for a natural eld
experiment. Moreover, even in carefully constructed eld experiments, low periodic-
ity, long lags to outcome realization, fungibility of investment funds and measurement
issues associated with micro-business data complicate the use of investment choice as
an outcome variable.5 An experiment overcomes each of these challenges. While
the use of an experiment entails a trade-o¤ between control and realism, I attempted
to maximize external validity with meaningful payo¤s of up to one weeks reported
income, subjects drawn from actual micronance clients, and an experimental de-
sign that closely simulates the underlying theory. This approach builds on Giné,
Jakiela, Karlan, and Morduch (2009), which pioneered the use of laboratory exper-
iments with a relevant subject pool in order to unpack the e¤ects of various design
features in micronance contracts.
The core experimental result is that joint liability produced signicant free-riding.
Risk-tolerant individuals, as measured in a benchmarking risk experiment, took signif-
icantly greater risk under joint liability with imperfect monitoring. Yet the transfers
4As described in Charness and Genicot (2009), this payment structure prevents individuals from
self-insuring income risk across rounds. The utility maximization problem of the experiment corre-
sponds to that of the theoretical model.
5Giné and Karlan (2011), for example, were able to randomize across joint and individual loan
contracts with a partner bank in the Philippines. They nd no di¤erence in default rates and faster
expansion of the client base under individual liability but are unable to evaluate investment behavior.
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they made when successful did not increase with the riskiness of their investments
or the expected default burden they placed on their partners. Increased risk-taking
was not evident under joint liability with perfect monitoring, and when individuals
were given explicit approval rights over their partnersinvestment choices, risk-taking
fell below that observed in autarky. Together, these results indicate that increased
risk-taking was not the product of cooperative insurance. They also suggest that
peer monitoring mechanisms, as embodied in explicit project approval rights, not
only prevent ex ante moral hazard but more generally discourage risky investments,
irrespective of whether or not such risks are e¢ cient. This may in part explain why
we see little evidence that micronance-funded businesses grow beyond subsistence
entrepreneurship. It may also help us reconcile some of the anecdotal evidence on
the limits of joint liability and the increasing willingness of micronance institutions
to consider contracts other than joint liability.6
The equity-like contract increased risk-taking and expected returns relative to
other contracts while at the same time producing the lowest default rates. Increased
risk was almost always hedged across borrowers, with the worst possible joint outcome
still su¢ cient for loan repayment. These results are encouraging and suggest that
equity-like contracts merit further exploration in the eld.
It is worth emphasizing that both the theory and experiment abstract from e¤ort,
willful default, partner selection, and savings. This is not meant to imply that any of
these factors is unimportant.7 Instead, the purpose is to isolate the elements of risk-
sharing, investment choice, and formal contracts and to explore their implications.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model
of informal risk-sharing with formal nancial contracts and endogenous investment
6In 2002, Grameen Bank in Bangladesh introduced the Grameen Generalized System, typically
referred to as Grameen II, which, among other features, formally eliminates joint nancial liability.
BancoSol, a large and well-known Bolivian micronance institution, has moved much of its portfolio
to individual loans. For anecdotal evidence on the limits of joint liability see, for example, Woolcock
(1999) and Montgomery (1996).
7The theory of strategic default on micronance contracts is explored in Besley and Coate (1995)
and Armendariz (1999), while Armendariz and Morduch (2005) and La¤ont and Rey (2003) both
treat moral hazard over e¤ort in detail. To the best of my knowledge, neither area has seen careful
empirical work in the context of micronance. Similarly, the empirical implications of savings for
informal risk sharing arrangements remain poorly understood. Bulow and Rogo¤s (1989) model of
sovereign debt implies that certain savings technologies can unravel relational contracts, including
informal insurance. Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2000) consider a simple storage technology
and nd that the ability to self-insure can crowd out informal transfers, with ambiguous welfare
implications.
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choice. Proofs are contained in Appendix A, unless otherwise noted. Section 3
describes the experimental design, and Section 4 presents the experimental results.
Section 5 concludes.
2 AModel of Investment Choice and Risk Sharing
The primary aim of this section is to illustrate important theoretical e¤ects of formal
nancial contracts and informal risk-sharing arrangements on investment choices and
to motivate a series of empirical tests. While the theoretical setting is distilled to
just those elements necessary to frame the informal risk-sharing and investment choice
problem, the economic environment remains quite complex. Multiple equilibria, is-
sues of equilibrium selection, and the importance of assumptions about the structure
of information and beliefs limit the ability to make general propositions. However,
restrictions to the particular economic environment modeled in the experiment will
allow some concrete empirical predictions derived from theory and numerical simu-
lations and, where such predictions are not sharp, to frame the theoretical e¤ects
inuencing behavior.
2.1 Overview of the Economic Environment
Consider a world where two individuals make periodic investments that are funded by
outside nancing. Each period, they each allocate their investment between a safe
project that generates a small positive return with certainty or a risky investment
that may fail but compensates for this risk by o¤ering a higher expected return.
Formal nancial contracts govern individualsability to borrow and hence their
investment opportunities. These formal nancial contracts specify the availability of
borrowing as a function of past outcomes, repayment terms, and the feasible range
of income transfers between agents. Their terms are set by a third party before the
start of the game and are constant throughout the game.8 The analysis considers four
principle types of formal nancial contracts: autarky, individual liability, joint liabil-
ity and quasi-equity, which is equivalent to joint liability with third-party enforced
equal sharing of all income. The individual and joint liability contracts capture
8This maps to the experimental setting where formal nancial contracts are the key dimension
of experimental variation and exogenously imposed for each game.
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key elements of micro-lending contracts that exist in practice. The other two are
counterfactual and provide benchmarks for risk-sharing arrangements, with practical
implications discussed more fully in Section 4. All four are described in more detail
below.
Individuals are risk averse, but they cannot save and lack access to formal insur-
ance. In order to maximize utility they therefore enter into an informal risk-sharing
arrangement that may extend beyond any sharing rules specied in the formal con-
tract. This informal arrangement is not legally enforceable and must therefore be
self-enforcing: an individual will transfer no more than the discounted value of what
she expects to get out of the relationship in the future.
Throughout, I consider two monitoring environments: perfect monitoring, where
all investment choices and income realizations are observable, and imperfect public
monitoring, where each player observes only her own actions and income realizations
as well as the transfers made by her partner.
2.2 The Economic Environment
I model the economic environment described above using a discrete-time, innite-





at time t = 0, where E0 is the expectation at time t = 0,  2 (0; 1) is the discount
factor, ci;t  0 denotes the consumption of agent i at time t, and ui represents agent
is per-period von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, which is assumed to be
nicely behaved: u0i(c) > 0; u
00
i (c) < 0 8c > 0 and limc!0 u0i(c) = 1. In the notation
that follows, I suppress the time and agent indicators where not required for clarity.
This remainder of this section describes the three components of the game struc-
ture: the stage game, the dynamic game, and formal nancial contracts.
Stage Game. The stage game depends on a state variable, fDA; DBg, that indi-
cates the amount of borrowing available to each agent and evolves according to a
deterministic transition function that is set by the formal nancial contract as de-
scribed below. In every stage game, player i chooses an action ai = (i;  i), which
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species an investment allocation and transfer. These actions are played in steps 2
and 4 of the stage game, respectively. Each stage game proceeds as follows:
1. Players begin the stage game with a formal nancial contract in place. Each
individual has zero wealth and access to a loan Di, where the amount of this
loan is specied by the formal nancial contract, described below. In describing
the stage game, I will proceed by considering the case in which Di = D for both
players.
2. From her total capital, Di, each individual allocates a share i 2 [0; 1] to a
risky investment that with probability  returns R for each unit allocated and
0 otherwise. The remainder, 1   i, she allocates to a safe investment that
returns S 2 [1; R) with certainty. Denote by i 2 fh; lg individual is state
realization. When the risky project succeeds (i = h), individual is total income
is yhi (i; Di) = fiR + (1  i)SgDi. When the risky project fails (i = l), her
income is yli(i; Di) = f(1   i)SgDi. Note that  is xed: the probability of
success is identical and independent across players and periods.
3. The state of nature is realized and each individual receives her income, yi.
Denote by  = (A; B) the state of nature, such that for any state , (yA; yB) =
(yAA ; y
B
B ). For notational simplicity I write the four states of nature as  =
fhh, hl, lh, ll}.9
4. Each individual chooses to transfer an amount  i 2 T fi  [ i;  i] to her partner,
where the feasible range is specied by the formal nancial contract and any
transfers above  i are voluntary. Income after transfers is ~yi = yi   ( i    i).
5. Loan repayment is determined mechanically: Pi = min(Di; ~yi). There is no
willful default.
6. Agents consume. Because agents cannot save, the specied loan repayment
uniquely determines consumption for the period: ci = yi   ( i    i)  Pi.
Dynamics. Consider an innite repetition of the stage game where preferences
and discounting are as described above. Players access to loans in step 1 of the
stage game, fDA;t; DB;tg, is given by a deterministic transition function that is set
9These states occur with probability 2, (1  ), (1  ), and (1  )2, respectively.
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by the formal contract, detailed below. As with actual micronance contracts, an
individuals ability to borrow in the current period is a function of past borrowing
and repayment.
Let ai;t = (i;t;  i;t) denote the action played by player i and t 2  denote
the state of nature realized in period t. In games of imperfect public monitoring,
each player observes only her own actions and income realizations as well as the
transfers made by her partner. Player is private history up to period t is given
by hti  fai;t0 ;  i;t0 ; i;t0gt 1t0=0; h0i is the empty set. Agents have observed more when
choosing their transfer in step 4 of the stage game than when choosing the preceding
investment: player iinterim private history in period t, ~hti, is the concatenation of
hti and fi;t; i;tg. For each t  0, H ti is the set of all hti; dene ~H ti analogously.
Based on the history of observed transfers, agents form beliefs, (), about the full
history of investment choices and income realizations. In games of perfect monitoring,
all investment choices and income realizations are observable, and a public history
ht  fai;t0 ; a i;t0 ; t0gt 1t0=0 is a list of t action proles identifying the actions played and
the state of nature in periods 0 through t  1. The interim public history in period
t, ~ht, is the concatenation of ht and fi;t;  i;t; tg. With h0 equal to the empty set,





dene ~Hi, H, and ~H analogously.
Formal Financial Contracts. I consider the above game under four di¤erent for-
mal nancial contracts. Each game begins with a formal contract in place that spec-
ies three rules, which are xed throughout each game: (1) a deterministic transition
function that determines the availability of borrowing (Di;t) based on prior period re-
payment (Pi;t 1 and P i;t 1) and borrowing (Di;t 1 and D i;t 1); (2) a feasible range
of transfers, T fi  [ i;  i], from each individual as a function of each individuals in-
come, yi and y i; and (3) loan repayment (Pi) as a function of income after transfers,
~yi. For all contracts, both individuals begin with access to a loan: DA;0 = DB;0 = D.
I also normalize the interest rate on all loans to zero and exclude the possibility of
willful default or ex post moral hazard an individual will always repay if she has
su¢ cient funds in order to focus on investment choice and risk-sharing behavior:
Pi = min(Di; ~yi).
Under autarky, an individual can borrow in the subsequent period if and only if
she repays her own loan in the current one: Di;t+1 = D if and only if Pi;t = Di;t = D.
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Individuals cannot make income transfers: T fi = f0g.
Under individual liability, an individual can borrow in the subsequent period if
and only if she repays her own loan in the current one: Di;t+1 = D if and only if
Pi;t = Di;t = D. Individuals can make voluntary income transfers: T
f
i = [0; yi]:
Under joint liability, an individual can only borrow in the subsequent period if
both she and her partner repaid their loans in the current period: Di;t+1 = D if and
only if Pi;t = Di;t = D for i 2 fA;Bg. If either individual has insu¢ cient funds to
repay her loan, her partner must help if she can. Additional voluntary transfers are
possible: T fi = [max(min(yi  Di; D i; y i); 0); yi].
Under the equity contract, as with joint liability, an individual can only borrow
in the subsequent period if both she and her partner repaid their loans in the current
period. Individuals must share their income equally before any voluntary transfers:




2.3 Strategies and Equilibria
Strategies and Restrictions. A pure strategy for player i, i, is a mapping from
all possible histories into the set of actions, Ai, with typical element ai. There are
two components to an action: an investment choice, i, and a transfer,  i. Strategies
map from H t into investment choices and from ~H t into transfers in games of perfect
monitoring and from H ti and ~H
t
i in games of imperfect public monitoring. Ui()
is is expected, discounted utility of strategy , where the expectation is taken over
histories. In addition to the standard requirements for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium,
I will consider equilibria whose strategies exhibit certain properties.
First, as is standard in the literature on informal insurance, the informal risk-
sharing arrangement is supported by trigger strategy punishments. If either party
reneges on the informal insurance arrangement, both members revert to the mini-
mum transfer prole, i.e., they exit the informal insurance arrangement in perpetuity
and make only those transfers required by the formal contract. Note that I assume
no direct punishment; the only consequence for reneging on the informal risk-sharing
arrangement is exclusion from further informal insurance possibilities. Second, im-
mediately subsequent transfers are the only future actions conditioned on investment
choices. This precludes, for example, both punishment based on prior investment
10
choices and using investment choices to punish.10
Third, I restrict attention to strategies where, outside any punishment phase,
transfers are only a function of current income realizations. Whenever the same
income, (yA; yB), is realized, the same transfers are made.11 ;12
To summarize, for each player there is an equilibrium-path investment level, e,
and a punishment-path investment level, p. Deviations from these investment lev-
els have no implications for continuation play. For each player, there is also an
equilibrium-path transfer rule that gives period-t transfers as a function of period-t
realized incomes only in particular, transfers are not a function of period-t invest-
ment levels and a punishment-path transfer that prescribes the minimum transfer
prole allowed by the nancial contract in each period.
Informal Insurance Arrangements. An informal insurance arrangement, T (A; B),
species the net transfer from A to B for any state of nature  given individualsal-
locations to the risky asset (A; B). Since individuals are risk averse and R > S,
in autarky both individuals will allocate an amount i 2 (0; 1] to the risky asset.
Because i > 0, there exist at least two states of the world where the autarkic ratios
of marginal utilities di¤er, and individuals will have an incentive to share risk. I
10Based on pilot results, I choose to restrict attention to equilibria that do not condition on
investment choices as this appears to more accurately reect participantsbehavior. Participants
described their partnersbehavior as untrustworthy, unfair, or non-cooperative when they failed to
make certain transfers conditional on their outcome and not based on their investment choices. Those
making risky investments were described as non-cooperative only if they failed to make signicant
transfers when their investments succeeded.
11Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2002) demonstrate that conditioning current transfers on the past
history of transfers, what they call the dynamic limited commitment model, increases the scope for
insurance. Adding a debt-like component to transfers, which they model as an evolution of the
Pareto weight in favor of the transferring partner, can relax her incentive compatibility constraint.
In any period, the debt repayment element from an individual who has received transfers in the past
can more than o¤set the static risk-sharing (insurance) component. This could lead to misleading
conclusions about the extent of informal insurance in any single period after the rst; however, in
expectation, the dynamic model simply expands the equilibrium set. The model in which transfers
are only a function of current income realizations, what Ligon, Thomas and Worrall refer to as
the static limited commitment model, therefore represents a conservative and analytically tractable
framework in which to interpret experimental results where transfer behavior is averaged over all
observations.
12In the empirical analysis, I restrict attention to transfers generating e¢ cient payo¤ vectors in
which the Pareto weight is equal to the ratio of marginal utilities in autarky. This restriction implies
that if both individuals make the investment allocation that would be optimal in autarky, regardless
of their risk preferences, transfers occur only when one project succeeds and one project fails (states
hl and lh).
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assume individuals can enter into an informal risk-sharing arrangement supported by
the expectation of future reciprocity. Conditional on individualsallocations to the






i ) species the transfer from i to  i in each
state of the world, and the vector T = TA TB fully species the transfer arrangement.
The minimum transfer prole describes the transfer vector in which individuals make
only those transfers required by the formal nancial contract. Note that although
individuals may choose not to make any voluntary (informal) transfers, they are still
subject to the transfer requirements, if any, of the formal nancial contract.13
With the restrictions on strategies described above, incentive compatibility re-
quires that in any state of the world the discounted future value of remaining in the
informal insurance arrangement must be at least as large as the potential one-shot
gain from deviation, i.e.,
u(yi    i +   i)  u(yi )  

Vi(; T )
1   Pr[Rij; T ]  
Vi(
p; 0)
1   Pr[Rijp; 0]

, (1)
where Pr[Rij; T ] is the probability that individual i meets the repayment terms of
her formal nancial contract (as described above) conditional on investment choice
 and transfer arrangement T ; VA(p; 0) = u(yh(p; D)) + (1   )u(yl(p; D)),
As expected per-period autarkic utility; VA(; T ) = 2u(yh(;D)   hh) + (1  
)u(yh(;D) hl)+(1 )u(yl(;D)  lh)+(1 )2u(yl(;D)  ll), As expected
per-period utility with investment choice  and transfer arrangement T ; and Bs
utility is dened analogously.
When formal contracts specify a minimum transfer   in state , I modify the
constraint accordingly:
u(yi  i+  i)  u(yi  i+  i) 

Vi(; T )
1   Pr[Rij; T ]  
Vi(
p; T )
1   Pr[Rijp; T ]

, (2)
where T = (hh; hl;  lh;  ll), the minimum transfer prole.
Denition 1 (Implementability) For an investment allocation (A; B), a trans-
fer arrangement, T , is implementable if and only if it satises both agentsincentive
13In the case of individual liability, the minimum transfer prole is analogous to reversion to
autarky. I choose an alternative designation here to avoid confusion with the autarky contract and
to highlight the fact that in the joint liability and equity contracts even agents who exit the informal
insurance arrangement may still be required to make transfers in certain states.
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compatibility constraints in all states, i.e., (2) holds for i 2 fA;Bg and 8.
Equilibrium. I will concentrate on perfect Bayesian equilibria with the restrictions
described above. In games of perfect monitoring, the set of relevant histories is the
set of all h 2 H [ eH; in games of imperfect public monitoring, this is the set of all
h 2 Hi [ fHi. I dene a restricted perfect Bayesian equilibrium (RPBE) as a strategy
prole  and beliefs () such that for all players i, all relevant histories h, and all
alternative strategies 
0






  Ui  0i;  ijh; (h), i.e., investment choices and transfer proles are
optimal conditional on beliefs, (iii) beliefs are updated according to Bayesrule where
applicable, and (iv) the immediately subsequent transfers are the only future actions
conditioned on investment choices. As described above, this restricts attention to
equilibria in which, outside any punishment phase, transfers are only a function of
current income realizations.
In games of perfect monitoring, where investment choices and income are ob-
servable, these equilibria simplify to subgame perfect equilibria as is standard in
the theoretical literature on informal insurance. Following previous literature, I will
concentrate on payo¤ vectors that are Pareto e¢ cient within the set of equilibrium
payo¤s.14 That is, individualsstrategies and beliefs must constitute an RPBE and
solve max;T UA() + UB(), where  is the Pareto weight placed on B.
2.4 The Impact of Contracts and Monitoring on Informal
Risk-Sharing
The following two sections develop predictions generated by the preceding model.
This section explores the e¤ects of monitoring and contracts on informal risk-sharing,
and Section 2.5 concerns risk-taking decisions. They provide a framework for inter-
preting the experimental results presented in sections 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. This
section divides the discussion of informal risk-sharing into two branches. First, I
examine the role of monitoring. Much of the literature on micronance discusses the
importance of peer monitoring and local information,15 and the experimental setting
14Of course, we could observe transfers inside the frontier. The empirical setting allows me to test
the practical applicability of this convention, and Section 4.1 describes the results of these tests.
15Among the numerous examples are Banerjee, Besley, and Guinnane (1994), Stiglitz (1990),
Wydick (1999), Chowdhury (2005), Conning (2005), Armendariz (1999), and Madajewicz (2004).
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was designed to test their importance by evaluating each contract with and without
perfect monitoring. Second, I examine the role of nancial contracts themselves,
focusing on the di¤erences between individual and joint liability.
Monitoring. Standard models of informal insurance assume perfect monitoring;
however, in practice, even when agents know one another well, this assumption is
unlikely to hold. A full characterization of the equilibria that are Pareto e¢ cient
under imperfect monitoring is sensitive to a number of assumptions. I will consider
symmetric equilibria, in the sense that punishment takes the form of reversion to
the minimum transfer prole, which punishes both parties. The result is ine¢ ciency.
Since mutual punishments are ine¢ cient and this punishment occurs with positive
probability, the set of sustainable transfer arrangements is bounded away from the
perfect-monitoring frontier.16
With imperfect public monitoring, at the time of making her transfer an individual
knows only her own private history. Her partners income is never revealed. Under







superscript denotes her own outcome. Her partner does likewise. We can assess the





that would implement a constrained e¢ cient equilibrium under perfect monitoring,
T , are themselves implementable under imperfect public monitoring.17 If h >  l
is to be incentive compatible, an individual who transfers  l must be punished with
some positive probability p. Because of imperfect monitoring, punishment cannot
be conditioned on income realization. This leads to the following prediction, which
section A.2 discusses in more detail:
Prediction 1 (monitoring and informal insurance) Fix the Pareto weight, .
Then the RPBE with perfect monitoring features transfers at least as large as the
RPBE with imperfect monitoring. If the incentive compatibility constraint is binding
in the RPBE with perfect monitoring, i.e., the transfer arrangement does not achieve
16This intuition is consistent with the work of Green and Porter (1984). Radner, Myerson, and
Maskin (1986) study a model of partnership games in which every equilibrium (symmetric and not)
is ine¢ cient, while Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994) identify conditions under which there
exist approximately e¢ cient equilibria.
17Note that only strategies T = (hh; hl;  lh;  ll) where hl+  lh = hh+  ll are replicable under
limited information.
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full insurance, then transfers in the RPBE with perfect monitoring are strictly larger
than those in the RPBE with imperfect monitoring.
Formal Financial Contracts. I now turn to the e¤ect of joint liability on informal
insurance. Joint liability will a¤ect the set of informal insurance arrangements that
are consistent with an RPBE through its e¤ect on the implementability constraint in
equation (2). When neither party takes default risk, joint liability does not require
transfers in any state of nature and will not a¤ect the set of implementable trans-
fers. However, when both agents have the potential for default and the transfers
required by joint liability improve both individualsexpected utility from the min-
imum transfer prole, V (p; T ), the scope for punishment by exiting the informal
insurance arrangement is reduced. In those states where transfers are not required
by the contract, this will tighten the incentive compatibility constraint in (2) and re-
duce the maximum implementable transfers. The e¤ect in states where transfers are
required is more nuanced, with the reduced scope for punishment o¤set by a smaller
gain from immediate deviation as well as the direct e¤ect of the mandatory transfer
itself. Similar o¤setting e¤ects occur when only one individual takes default risk.
In this case, the risk-taking individuals utility increases relative to individual liabil-
ity without voluntary transfers she benets from the mandatory insurance of joint
liability reducing her willingness to make informal transfers. The reverse holds for
her partner, and the net e¤ect is ambiguous. For games of perfect monitoring, these
e¤ects are summarized in the following prediction, which is discussed in more detail
in Section A.2.
Prediction 2 (joint liability and informal insurance) Fix the Pareto weight, ,
and consider a game of perfect monitoring and an RPBE under individual liability
(T= 0) in which the transfer prole, T , implements a constrained e¢ cient RPBE.
The addition of joint liability (T 6= 0) exerts four opposing e¤ects on the transfer
prole, T 0, that implements a constrained e¢ cient RPBE: (i) by mandating trans-
fers from ones partner (9 s.t.  i > 0), joint liability increases an agents utility
from the non-cooperative (punishment) equilibrium. This reduces the scope for pun-
ishment and therefore reduces the agents maximum incentive compatible transfers;
(ii) by mandating transfers to ones partner (9 s.t.  i > 0), joint liability reduces
an agents utility from the non-cooperative equilibrium and hence increases the max-
imum incentive compatible transfers; (iii) when transfers are required joint liability
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reduces the scope for immediate deviation (if  i > 0 then u(yi  i+ i) > u(yi)) and
therefore increases the maximum incentive compatible transfers; (iv) in states of the
world where transfers are required for debt repayment, joint liability can mechanically
increase transfers. The net e¤ect of these forces depends on the specic parameters
and individual preferences.
To motivate further the empirical tests, we can solve numerically for specic pa-
rameter values relevant to the empirical setting in order to describe the payo¤ vectors
that are Pareto e¢ cient in the set of equilibrium payo¤s.18 The incentive compatibil-
ity constraints in (1) and (2) describe a set of constrained-e¢ cient risk transfers with
each point determined by the relative weight assigned to each agent by the social
planner. As a benchmark, I selected a single point on this frontier using a Pareto
weight, , equal to the ratio of marginal utilities in state hh under autarky.19 A clear
pattern emerges from the numerical simulations. For the parameter values used in
the experiment, joint liability generally crowds out informal insurance when at least
one individual takes default risk. For example, consider two individuals with con-
stant relative risk aversion, u(c) = c(1 )=(1 ), and risk aversion parameters of 0.52
and 0.39 who allocate 0.375 and 0.625 to the risky asset, respectively.20 Individual li-
ability supports a transfer from the individual taking more risk of approximately 30%
18See Section 3 for a detailed description of the experimental setting. It maps closely to the
environment with parameter values S = 1, R = 3, D = 1,  = 0:75, and  = 0:5; however, as
explained therein, subjects were presented with eight discrete investment choices rather than the
continuous allocation problem described here.
19I set  = 0  u0A(A(R   S) + S   D)=u
0
B(B(R   S) + S   D), where A and B are the
actual investment choices made by each agent. If this weight did not admit a non-zero, individually-
rational transfer arrangement irrespective of the incentive compatibility constraints, I set  to the
closest value of  that would. Specically, there exists a feasible set of Pareto weights, [; ], for
which a non-zero, individually-rational, implementable transfer arrangement may exist. If 0 > 
then I set  = , and if 0 < , I set  = : From this starting point of a transfer vector that
achieves full insurance with a Pareto weight of  , I numerically searched for the transfer vector that
would implement a constrained e¢ cient RPBE. See Section 4.1 for a discussion of the empirical
implications of the choice of starting weights.
To determine the range of , I solve argmaxT VA(A; T ) s.t. VB(B ; T )  VB(B ; T ), that is,
for agents actual investment choices, the transfer arrangement that maximizes As utility while
satisfying Bs participation constraint. The solution is a transfer arrangement that achieves full









D + )  . Similarly, I dene  as the ratio of marginal utilities that obtains from the transfer
arrangement that maximizes Bs utility while satisfying As participation constraint.
20This corresponds to benchmark risk allocations of D and E in the experiment and corresponding
investment choices of C and E. The vector of maximum incentive compatible transfer based on
Pareto weights as described in the text is ( 54:4; 22:0; 98:8; 0). No informal transfers are incentive
compatible under joint liability.
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of her income when both projects succeed and 55% when only her project does. In
exchange, when her project fails she receives approximately 16% of her partners in-
come, which both generates positive consumption and prevents default. In contrast,
under joint liability, no informal transfers are incentive compatible. The partner
taking default risk can rely on mandatory transfers and thus has no need to make
compensating transfers when her project succeeds. The chief exception to this pat-
tern of crowding out occurs when one partner is particularly risk averse.21 In this
case, the utility cost of inducing su¢ cient transfers from her to prevent default under
individual liability is very high. Intuitively, the risk-averse partner does not want
to be exposed to additional risk through an informal insurance arrangement. Under
joint liability, the mandatory transfer requirement binds and transfers are larger than
under individual liability.
2.5 The Impact of Contracts and Monitoring on Risk-Taking
I now turn to the e¤ect of formal and informal insurance on individualsallocation
to the risky asset. Intuitively, informal insurance exerts two e¤ects on risk-taking de-
cisions. First, transfers from individuals with successful projects to partners whose
projects fail increase agentsallocation to the risky asset. Second, pooling of in-
come moves each agents optimal investment choice to a point between their autarkic
choices; this e¤ect increases the optimal allocation to the risky asset for the more risk-
averse agent and reduces the allocation for the more risk tolerant. While, the general
e¤ect of informal insurance on risk-taking depends on parameter values, preferences
and Pareto weights, these two factors lead to the following prediction.
Prediction 3 (informal insurance and risk taking) Fix the Pareto weight, ,
and consider a transfer arrangement T that implements an RPBE. If transfers are
made only when exactly one risky project succeeds (T = (0; hl;  lh; 0); hl;  lh > 0)
then both individualsallocations to the risky asset are greater than under the RPBE
without transfers, T = (0; 0; 0; 0). If the transfer arrangement achieves full insurance
(u
0
(yA   )=u0(yB +  ) = , a constant, for all ), then the less risk-tolerant partner
will unambiguously allocate more to the risky asset than she would in an equilibrium
without informal transfers;however, the di¤erence in the investment allocation by the
more risk-tolerant partner is indeterminate.
21This corresponds to benchmark risk choices A or B, equivalent to  > 1:
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Section A.2 discusses this prediction in more detail. Note that the rst part of the
prediction leads to the corollary that in any equilibrium that includes a symmetric
insurance arrangement, both parties will allocate more to the risky asset than they
would in an equilibrium without transfers. This would include as a special case
the equity contract when both parties make the same investment. For asymmetric
arrangements, both of the aforementioned e¤ects cause the more risk-averse partner
to allocate more to the risky asset than in an equilibrium without transfers, while
they exert opposing e¤ects on the more risk-tolerant partners decision. With full
insurance, restricting the Pareto weight to be equal to the ratio of marginal utilities in
autarky is su¢ cient to ensure that total risk-taking increases.22 Note, however, that
if the Pareto weight is su¢ ciently skewed towards the utility of the less risk-tolerant
agent, total risk-taking by the pair can fall. For example, consider the following
environment: S = 1, R = 3, D = 1,  = 0:75, and  = 0:5. When individuals A
and B have CRRA risk aversion parameters of 0:2 and 2:5, their autarkic allocations
to the risky asset are 0:91 and 0:10; respectively. With full insurance and equal
Pareto weights, the optimal total allocation to the risky asset increases to 1:22. The
allocation that maximizes Bs utility subject to meeting As participation constraint,
that is, an allocation that puts all of the decision weight on the less risk-tolerant
individual, sees only 0:78 allocated to the risky asset.
The interaction between informal insurance and investment choice can produce
surprising results. In contrast to standard models of informal insurance with exoge-
nous income processes, a model with endogenous investment choice has the interesting
feature that more risk-tolerant individuals may engage in greater risk sharing. Con-
sider the environment described above. The maximum sustainable insurance transfer
is realized for individuals with  = 0:55 who select  = 0:42. They transfer, 0:82 or
65% of the full risk-sharing amount in states lh and hl. More risk-tolerant individuals
are too impatient to support additional transfers, while more risk-averse individuals
allocate a lower share to the risky asset. In the experimental setting described in
Section 3, the optimal investment choice for two individuals with  = 0:4 generates
22While there is intuitive appeal to extending the results to arrangements where full insurance
is not achieved, the conclusion is not maintained without additional assumptions on the method of
equilibrium selection. As discussed in the appendix, starting from autarkic investment allocations,
transfers from the less risk-tolerant partner in state hh and from the more risk-tolerant partner in
ll will increase total risk taking; however, the direction of transfers in these states depends itself on
the investment choices made by both individuals.
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a payo¤ (yh; yl) of (160; 40) and supports a maximum transfer of 42; or 70% of the
full insurance transfer. For individuals with  = 0:6, the optimal investment choice
generates a payo¤ of (140; 50) and supports a maximum transfer of 26 or 59% of full
insurance. Table 2 details the maximum sustainable transfer for all symmetric choice
pairs and a range of risk aversion indices, and Table 3 demonstrates the interaction
between informal insurance and investment choice, with more cooperative informal
insurance supporting increased risk-taking.
Turning to formal contracts, joint liability exerts three inuences on project choice:
free-riding, risk mitigation, and debt distortion. Figure 2 illustrates these e¤ects,
plotting individual Bs best response function for B with respect to A in the envi-
ronment S = 1, R = 3, D = 1,  = 0:75, and  = 0:5 where B = 0:4. The dashed
line shows B(A) under individual liability with no informal insurance. Because
there is no strategic interaction in this setting, Bs best response is constant. Under
joint liability with no informal insurance, three distinct e¤ects are evident. First,
for low values of A, B takes greater risk, free-ridingon the e¤ective default insur-
ance provided by A. As A rises, B returns to its level under individual liability;
however, once A > 0:5, B must make transfers to A to prevent default when As
project is unsuccessful. As a consequence, B reduces her own risk-taking. Once As
risk-taking is su¢ ciently large (here, A  0:9) the cost of providing default insurance
is too great (Bs payo¤ after transfers is states hl and, particularly, ll, is too low);
the usual distortionary e¤ects of debt with limited liability take over; and Bs best
response is to allocate all of her capital to the risky asset.
Taken together, these factors imply that when insurance is required by joint liabil-
ity, an individuals risk-taking may increase or decrease relative to autarky. Consider
the following numerical example. Two individuals with CRRA utility and risk aver-
sion parameter  = 0:5 are in an environment with S = 1, R = 3, D = 1,  = 0:9,
and  = 0:5. In autarky, each individuals optimal allocation to the risky asset, ,
is 0:25. Now consider the situation in which they are paired under joint liability
and no informal insurance. There are now three Nash equilibria to the stage game:
(0; 1), (1; 0) and (0:25; 0:25). The rst two equilibria demonstrate the free riding and
risk mitigation e¤ects of joint liability. In response to increased risk-taking by their
partners, individuals may reduce their own investment in the risky asset relative to
autarky. This example also leads to the following prediction:
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Prediction 4 (joint liability and risk taking) Fix the Pareto weight, , and con-
sider RPBE with no voluntary transfers under both individual (T = 0) and joint li-
ability (T =T ). If neither partner would take default risk under individual liability,
i.e., (1   i)S  1 for i 2 fA;Bg, then the total allocation to the risky asset by
both individuals (A + B) is weakly greater under joint liability than under individ-
ual liability. However, if either partner optimally takes default risk under individual
liability, the di¤erence in the total allocation to the risky asset is indeterminate.
Intuitively, if neither partner would take default risk in autarky, the need for any
risk mitigation is limited to the amount that ones partner increases her risk-taking
and the total impact is unambiguously non-negative. When at least one individual
would take default risk in autarky, the problem does not admit a clean analytical
solution; however, numerical simulations allow us to characterize how risk-taking
responds to joint liability in di¤erent regions of the parameter space. For most of the
empirically relevant values, total risk-taking weakly increases. However, there are
three regions where total risk-taking can fall when moving from individual liability to
joint liability with only those transfers required for debt repayment. In all cases, at
least one individual optimally chooses to take maximal risk in autarky. First, when
there is a large di¤erence in risk aversion, the desire to prevent joint default can push
the more risk-averse party to reduce her allocation to the risky asset. Second, when
 is su¢ ciently large and S is less than 2, such that no single individuals allocation
to the safe asset would be su¢ cient to repay both loans, a relatively risk-tolerant
individual may reduce her own allocation to the risky asset because the possibility of
transfers from her partner reduces her own utility cost to preventing default. Third,
when the probability of success, , and the relative return to the risky asset, R=S,
are both su¢ ciently close to 1, i.e., the risky asset is not too risky, even relatively
risk-averse individuals will allocate their entire investment to the risky asset under
autarky for  su¢ ciently low. For intermediate values of , the possibility to guarantee
repayment and hence future borrowing by reducing risk-taking can lead both parties
to reduce their allocation to the risky asset.
Finally, I discuss the e¤ect of approval rights on risk-taking. Joint liability con-
tracts may confer explicit approval rights over a partners project choice. These
approval rights may be exogenous and absolute (Stiglitz 1990) or enforceable through
social sanctions. While explicitly modeling such approval rights is beyond the scope
of this model, they are practically important and, as described in Section 3, can be
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carefully studied in the experimental setting. It is therefore useful to frame the theo-
retical forces inuencing their potential e¤ects on investment choices. On one hand,
approval rights provide an additional punishment mechanism, which can extend the
set of equilibrium payo¤s. On the other hand, when insurance is imperfect, approval
rights may be used directly to curtail a partners risk-taking when it reduces ones
own utility. Observed behavior will depend on which equilibria is expected in the
risk-sharing game. We can make the following conjecture.
Prediction 5 (approval rights) For transfer arrangements su¢ ciently close to the
minimum transfer prole, own payo¤s under joint liability are decreasing in ones
partners risk-taking and approval rights will likely reduce risk-taking.
The reasoning behind this prediction is at the core of the free-riding problem: the
risk-taking partner benets from the mandatory transfers required by joint liability
and does not compensate her partner for this insurance. Her partner may use approval
rights to prevent risk-taking because she is jointly responsible for failure but does not
share the gains from success.
3 Experimental Design and Procedures
3.1 Basic Structure
This section describes a series of experiments designed to simulate the economic envi-
ronment described in Section 2. Subjects were recruited from the clients of Mahase-
mam, a large micronance institution in urban Chennai, a city of seven million people
in southeastern India. All were women, and their mean reported daily income was
approximately Rs. 55 or $1.22 at then-current exchange rates. Participants earned
an average of Rs. 81 per session, including a Rs. 30 show-up fee, and experimental
winnings ranged from Rs. 0 to Rs. 250.
Mahasemam organizes its clients into groups of 35 to 50 women called kendras.
These kendras meet weekly for approximately one hour with a bank eld o¢ cer
to conduct loan repayment activities. To recruit individuals for the experiment, I
attended these meetings and introduced the experiment. Those interested in partici-
pating were given invitations for a specic experimental session occurring within the
following week and told that they would receive Rs. 30 for showing up on time.
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At the start of each session, individuals played an investment game to benchmark
their risk preferences. Subjects were given a choice between eight lotteries, each of
which yielded either a high or low payo¤ with probability 0.5. Panel A of Table 4
summarizes the eight choices.23 Payo¤s in the benchmarking game ranged from Rs.
40 with certainty for choice A to an equal probability of Rs. 120 or Rs. 0 for choice
H.
The body of the session then consisted of two to ve games, each comprising an
uncertain number of rounds. Figure 1 summarizes timing for each round of the stage
game. At the start of each game, individuals were publicly and randomly matched
with one other participant (t = 0 in Figure 1) and endowed with a token worth Rs.
40 (t = 1), which was described as a loan that could be used to invest in a project
but which needed to be repaid at the end of each round. Each subject then used the
token to indicate her choice from a menu of eight investment lotteries (t = 2), after
which we collected their tokens. Because many subjects were illiterate, I illustrated
the choices graphically as shown in Figure A1. These lotteries were designed to elicit
subjects risk preferences and were ranked according to risk and return. Payo¤s
ranged from Rs. 80 with certainty for choice A to an equal probability of Rs. 280
or 0 for choice H; the other choices were distributed between these two.24 Because
expected prots increase monotonically with risk, they serve as a proxy for risk-taking
in the discussion below.
We then determined returns for each individuals project and paid this income in
physical game money (t = 3). Pilot studies suggested that participants understood
the game more clearly and payo¤s were more salient when the game money was
physical and translated one-for-one to rupees. After individuals received their income,
they could transfer to their partners any amount up to their total earnings for the
23To determine investment success, subjects played a game where a researcher randomly and
secretly placed a black stone in one hand and a white stone in the other. Subjects then picked a
hand and earned the amount shown in the color of the stone that they picked (gure A1). Nearly
all subjects played a similar game as children in which one player hides a single object, usually
a coin or stone, in one of her hands. If the other player guesses the correct hand, they win the
object and are allowed to hide the object in her hands. In Tamil, the game is known as either
kandupidi vilayaattu, which translates roughly as the nd-it game,or kallu vilayaattu, the stone
game. Subjects experience with games similar to the experiments randomizing device provides
some condence that the probabilities of the game are reasonably well understood.
24The granularity of choices entailed a trade-o¤ between feasibility (both subjectscomprehen-
sion and experimental logistics) and mapping as closely as possible to the theoretical framework of
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Figure 1: Timing of Events
period, subject to the rules of the nancial contract treatment (t = 4). The next
subsection describes these nancial contract treatments in detail. After transfers
were completed, we collected the loan repayment of Rs. 40 from each participant
(t = 5). Willful default was not possible; if an individual had su¢ cient funds to
repay, she had to repay.
After total earnings were calculated (t = 6), the game continued with a probability
of 75% (t = 7). If the game continued, each individual played another round of the
same game with the same partner beginning again at t = 1.25 Those who had
repaid their loans in the prior period, subject to the terms of the di¤erent contract
treatments discussed below, received a new loan token and were able to invest again.
Those who had been unable to repay in a previous round sat out and scored zero for
each round until the game ended. This continuation method simulates the discrete-
time, innite-horizon game described in Section 2 with a discount rate of 33%. The
game is also stationary; at the start of any round, the expected number of subsequent
rounds in the game was four. When a game ended, loan tokens were returned to
anyone who had defaulted and participants were randomly rematched with a di¤erent
partner. Subjects were informed that once a game ended, they would not play again
with the same partner.
In all treatments, individuals were allowed to communicate with their partners.
Communication was an important step towards realism; however, the lack of anonymity
raises concerns about the potential for out-of-game punishment and rewards. Al-
though stakes were relatively high, the experiment took place within the context of a
larger meta-game of social interactions. To mitigate these concerns, individuals from
at least two geographically-separated kendras were invited to each session; approxi-
mately 75% of participants were matched with a partner from a di¤erent kendra.26 I
25I determined if the current game would continue by drawing a colored ball from a bingo cage
containing 15 white balls and 5 red. If a white ball was drawn, the game continued. If a red ball
was drawn, the game ended.
26To further reduce the possibility of out-of-game interaction, we organized payment to all partic-
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included within-kendra matches to test the e¤ect of these linkages, and all results are
reported for both outside- and within-kendra pairs.
At the start of each game, we verbally explained the rules to all subjects and
conrmed understanding through a short quiz and a practice round. The online
appendix provides an example of the verbal instructions, translated from the Tamil.
At the end of each session, subjects completed a survey covering their occupations
and borrowing and repayment experience. The survey also included three trust
and fairness questions from the General Social Survey (GSS) and a version of the
self-reported risk-taking questions from the German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP).27
I then paid each subject privately and condentially for only one period drawn at
random for each individual at the end of the session. This is a key design feature.
If every round were included for payo¤, individuals could partially self-insure income
risk across rounds (Charness and Genicot 2009).
3.2 Financial Contract Treatments
Using the basic game structure described above, I considered ve contract treatments:
autarky, individual liability, joint liability, joint liability with approval rights, and
equity. Each required loan repayment of Rs. 40 per borrower and included dynamic
incentives subjects failing to meet contractual repayment requirements were unable
to borrow in future rounds and earned zero for each remaining round of the game. The
ipants according to kendra so members of each group could leave the lab at di¤erent times. While
kendras were geographically separated, it was possible that individuals from di¤erent kendras could
meet up outside the game, particularly at their local micronance branches. However, discussions
with participants and Mahasemam lending o¢ cers suggested that such occurrences would be rare.
For two sessions, numbers 6 and 8 as described in Table 5, all participants were from a single kendra.
Results are robust to excluding these sessions.
27The three GSS questions are the same as those used by Giné, Jakiela, Karlan, and Morduch
(2009) and Cassar, Crowley, and Wydick (2007). Back-translated from the Tamil, they are: (1)
Generally speaking, would you say that people can be trusted or that you cant be too careful in
dealing with people?; (2) Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got
a chance, or would they try to be fair?; and (3) Would you say that most of the time people try
to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves? Dohmen, Falk, Hu¤man,
Schupp, Sunde, and Wagner (2006) demonstrates the e¤ectiveness of self-reported questions about
ones willingness to take risks in specic areas (e.g., nancial matters or driving) at predicting risky
behaviors in those areas. Based on this nding, I asked the following question: How do you see
yourself? As it relates to your business, are you a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do
you try to avoid taking risks? Please tick a box on the scale where 0 means unwilling to take risks
and 10 means fully prepared to take risks. Subject were unaccustomed to abstract, self-evaluation
questions and had di¢ culty answering.
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Table 1: Summary of Financial Contract Treatments
Explicit Third-Party
Communi- Dynamic Informal Joint Project Enforced
cation Incentives Risk Sharing Liability Approval Transfers
Autarky (A)  
Individual Liability (IL)   
Joint Liability (JL)    
Joint Liability with Approval (JLA)     
Equity (E)     
ve experimental contract treatment described below embody the contracts described
in Section 2.
Autarky (A). This treatment comprised individual liability lending without the
possibility of income transfers. It captures the key features of dynamic loan repayment
and provides a benchmark against which to measure the e¤ect of other contracts and
informal insurance on risk-taking behavior. Each subject was paired with another
participant and could communicate freely as in all other treatments; however, no
transfers are possible between individuals. Subjects were able to continue play if and
only if they were able to repay Rs. 40 after their project return was realized.
Individual Liability (IL). This treatment embedded individual lending in an
environment with informal risk-sharing. It followed the same formal contract struc-
ture of the autarky treatment but allowed subjects to make voluntary transfers to
their partners after project returns were realized and before loan repayment.
Joint Liability (JL). This treatment captures the core feature of most micro-
nance contracts, joint liability. Members of a pair were jointly responsible for each
othersloan repayments. A subject was able to continue play only if both she and
her partner repaid Rs. 40. To isolate the e¤ect of the formal contract and minimize
framing concerns, instructions for this treatment di¤ered from those for individual
liability only in their description of repayment requirements.
Joint Liability with Approval Requirement (JLA). This treatment modies
basic joint liability to require partner approval of investment choices and reects the
assumption, proposed by Stiglitz (1990), that joint-liability borrowers have the ability
to force safe project choices on their partners. It di¤ered from the joint liability
treatment only in that immediately after participants indicated their project choices,
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we asked their partner if they approved of the choice. A subject whose partner
did not approve her choice was automatically assigned choice A, the riskless option.
Note that under the imperfect monitoring treatment, approval rights also remove any
uncertainty about ones partners investment choice.
Equity (E). In this treatment I enforced an equal division of all income thereby
eliminating the commitment problem and the implementability constraint it places
on insurance transfers. Participants were able to make additional transfers, and the
game was otherwise identical to the joint liability treatment.
3.3 Monitoring Treatments
All of the nancial contract treatments except for autarky were played under two mon-
itoring regimes: perfect and imperfect public monitoring. As described in Section 2.4,
much of the literature on micronance discusses the importance of peer monitoring
and local information, and these treatments were designed to see how monitoring
a¤ects performance under di¤erent contracts. In all treatments, we seated mem-
bers of a pair together and allowed them to communicate freely. Under perfect
monitoring, all actions and outcomes were observable. Under imperfect public
monitoring, we separated partners with a physical divider that allowed communica-
tion but prevented them from seeing each others investment choices and outcomes.
After investment outcomes were realized, we informed each participant if her partner
had su¢ cient income to repay her own loan. Transfer amounts were observed only
after the transfer was completed.28
4 Experimental Results
In total, I have 3,443 observations from 450 participant-sessions, representing 256
unique subjects. All sessions were run between March 2007 and May 2007 at a tem-
porary experimental economic laboratory in Chennai, India. I conducted 24 sessions,
averaging two hours each, excluding time spent paying subjects. As summarized
in Table 5, the number of participants per session ranged from 8 and 24, depending
on show-ups. The mean was 18.75. Participants were invited to attend multiple
28Using physical game money, each player placed her transfer in a bowl behind the physical divider.
Experimental assistants then swapped the bowls simultaneously. Unobservability was successfully
enforced with the threat of nancial punishment and dismissal from the experiment.
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sessions, and the number of sessions per participants ranged from 1 to 6, with a mean
of 1.75. Summary statistics appear in Table 6.
In the subsections that follow, I separate the experimental results into two cat-
egories. Section 4.1 describes the e¤ect of contracts and monitoring on informal
risk-sharing. Section 4.2 concerns risk-taking and project choice.
4.1 The Impact of Contracts and Monitoring on Informal
Risk-Sharing
RESULT 1. Actual informal insurance transfers fall well short of full risk-sharing and
the maximum implementable informal insurance arrangement with perfect monitoring.
On average, transfers achieve only 14% of full risk-sharing and approximately 30% of
the maximum implementable transfer.
As discussed in Section 2, existing models of informal insurance with limited com-
mitment, including this one, do not make unique predictions for observed transfers.
The dynamic game setting admits a multiplicity of equilibria that always includes
the minimum transfer prole, i.e., no voluntary transfers. However there is a natural
tendency to focus on payo¤ vectors that are Pareto e¢ cient in the set of equilibrium
payo¤s, which places an upper bound on the performance of informal insurance and
may also represent the outcome of focal strategies (Coate and Ravallion 1993). I
calculate the transfers that would implement the e¢ cient payo¤ vector using numeri-
cal simulations based on individualsCRRA risk-aversion parameters estimated from
the benchmarking risk experiments, actual project choices for each subject pair, and
a static transfer arrangement.29 These experimental results nd observed transfers
well below those achieved by either full risk-sharing or those required for constrained
e¢ ciency.
29This describes a set of transfer vectors with each vector determined by the relative weight
assigned to each agent by the social planner. As a benchmark, I selected a single transfer vector using
a Pareto weight, , equal to the ratio of marginal utilities in state hh under autarky. If this weight did
not admit a non-zero, individually-rational transfer arrangement (e.g., one agent preferred autarky
to any transfer arrangement based on the starting weight), I searched numerically and selected
the weight closest to this initial value for which a non-zero transfer arrangement was individually
rational. In general, performance relative to the constrained-e¢ cient transfer arrangement should
be interpreted with caution. When incentive compatibility constraints are binding or agents have
di¤erent preferences, expected transfers are not independent of the Pareto weight. However, in
the current setting, where the probability of any state is symmetric and independent of the Pareto
weight, the results are robust to calculating the benchmark transfer vector based on any weight
satisfying both agentsparticipation constraints, provided such a weight exists.
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Columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 summarize net transfers from the partner with higher
income under individual liability, joint liability and joint liability with approval.
Columns 3 and 4 report the same information conditional on exactly one project
in the pair succeeding. This corresponds to states hl and lh, where the direction
of transfers is independent from assumptions about Pareto weights. If risk-sharing
were complete, these transfers would equal one-half of the di¤erence between payo¤s;
however, in each case transfers are well below the full risk-sharing benchmark. Joint
liability with perfect monitoring generates the highest net transfers, 5.3, but this is
only 27% of the full risk-sharing amount of 19.6. These shortfalls arise along both
the extensive and intensive margins. For individual and joint liability contracts with
perfect monitoring, either individual made a transfer in only 50% of all rounds. Under
imperfect public monitoring, the probability of any transfer fell to 30%. Furthermore,
when transfers were made, they tended to remain well below the full risk-sharing
benchmark. Again, joint liability with perfect monitoring produces the largest net
transfers relative to full insurance, but conditional on any transfer being made they
still average only 43% of the full insurance amount. While transfers occur more often
under joint liability with approval in 72% of all rounds with perfect monitoring and
47% without net transfers were smaller than those in other contracts.
This result may explain why we see semi-formal risk-sharing mechanisms, such as
the state-contingent loans used for risk smoothing in northern Nigeria (Udry 1994);
highlights the importance of equilibrium selection; and casts doubt on constrained
e¢ ciency as the focal selection criteria for informal risk-sharing equilibria. The pre-
ponderance of empirical research on informal insurance with limited commitment
suggests that actual transfers fall short of full insurance.30 While this can in part be
explained by implementability constraints imposed by limited commitment (Ligon,
Thomas, and Worrall 2002), these experimental results suggest that actual informal
insurance may settle on an equilibrium with payo¤s well below what would be con-
strained e¢ cient. One possible explanation, consistent with the results from Char-
ness and Genicot (2009), is that e¢ ciency may be easier to obtain when there is
an obvious focal strategy. In their experiment, transfers were close to theoretically
predicted amounts when subjects had identical and perfectly negatively correlated
30See, for example, Townsends (1994) study of risk and insurance in the ICRISAT villages; Udrys
(1994) work on informal credit markets as insurance in northern Nigeria; and Fafchamps and Lunds
(2003) study of quasi-credit in the Philippines.
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income processes; however, with heterogeneity, actual transfers were substantially
below predicted levels and close to those I observed.31 Exploring alternative selec-
tion criteria, such as risk-dominance in the sense of Harsanyi and Selten (1988), o¤ers
a promising avenue for future research.
Although informal insurance consistently fell short of the theoretical maximum,
formal contracts and information greatly inuence risk-sharing behavior. The next
result highlights the importance of monitoring.
RESULT 2. Informal insurance is substantially larger under perfect monitoring than
when monitoring is imperfect. On average, transfers under perfect monitoring are
60% larger than those when monitoring is imperfect.
As shown in Prediction 1, we expect cooperation will be harder to sustain when
monitoring is imperfect. In practice, this e¤ect is large and economically signicant.
Net transfers under both individual and joint liability with imperfect monitoring are
roughly half what they are under perfect monitoring. This result is evident in Figure
4 and the summary statistics presented in Table 7. Table 8 reports the results from
the cell-means regression
 it =  +
X
j
jTj + "it, (3)
where  it is the transfer made by individual i in round t, and Tj is a indicator for the
contract and monitoring treatment. In all contracts, perfect monitoring generated
substantially larger transfers than imperfect monitoring. The percentage di¤erence
was largest under individual liability, where mean transfers increase from 2.42 to
5.83, or 140%, and is substantial in all contracts. As shown in columns 1 through 4
of Table 7, perfect monitoring more than doubles observed net transfers as a percent-
age of the benchmark constrained e¢ cient transfer for both the individual and joint
liability contracts. Wilcoxon rank-sum tests reject equivalence at any conventional
signicance level (p < 0:0001) for all contracts. Columns 5 through 12 of Table 7
detail transfer behavior for outside and within-kendra pairs. Surprisingly, while net
transfers are higher when individuals are paired with someone from their same kendra,
31There is some suggestive evidence that transfers may be higher as a percentage of the constrained
Pareto maximum under both individual and joint liability when both parties pick the same project;
however, this evidence is not robust. Transfers as a percentage of full risk-sharing are approximately
equivalent for both symmetric and non-symmetric investment choices (approximately 20% under
individual liability and 30% under joint liability). There is no evidence that when both parties have
the same baseline risk preferences transfers are larger as a share of the constrained-e¢ cient transfer
or full insurance.
29
the di¤erences are not statistically signicant, and transfers as a percentage of full
insurance or those necessary to implement the e¢ cient payo¤ vector are comparable
in both groups.
I now turn to a specic form of cooperation: transfers made when both members of
a pair have su¢ cient income to repay their loans. These upsidetransfers represent
pure insurance.
RESULT 3. Upside risk-sharing is greater under joint liability, increasing by 40%
under perfect monitoring and more than doubling under imperfect monitoring.
We would expect that joint liability and the threat of common punishment would
induce loan repayment assistance when one party lacked su¢ cient funds to repay and
the other was able to cover the shortfall. However, as shown in Prediction 2, the
impact of joint liability contracts on upsidetransfers, i.e., transfers excluding loan
repayment assistance and thus representing pure insurance, is theoretically ambigu-
ous. There is substantial overlap in the set of sustainable equilibrium transfers in all
contract treatments. For example, the minimum transfer prole, no transfers beyond
what is contractually required, is an equilibrium strategy under any formal contract.
In practice, joint liability substantially increases observed upside risk-sharing.
Table 9 shows the results from the cell-mean regression of upside transfers, i.e.,
transfers excluding loan repayment assistance, made by individuals in each contract
setting when their investments are successful. Upside transfers under joint liability
are 3.85 (120%) and 2.94 (40%) larger than transfers under individual liability with
imperfect and perfect monitoring. These di¤erences are signicant at the 1%- and 5%-
levels. Much of this di¤erence is driven by risk-tolerant individuals, whose transfers
increase by 6.32 (228%) and 6.03 (132%) under joint liability. That risk-tolerant
individuals increase their total transfers when successful under joint liability with
imperfect monitoring may be expected given that, as discussed in Result 6, they also
take signicantly greater risk. As a consequence, their total payo¤ when successful
is larger and they have more to share. They also accrue a greater debt by requiring
assistance when their projects fail. However, risk-tolerant individualstransfers as a
percentage of the full risk-sharing amount also increase from 9.7% under individual
liability to 17.5% under joint liability. They also increase their upside transfers under
perfect monitoring, which did not increase their risk-taking. With perfect monitoring,
risk-tolerant individualsnet transfers as a percentage of full risk-sharing increase from
25.7% to 47.5%.
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Joint liability also appears to increase upside transfers made by risk-averse indi-
viduals, although this e¤ect is more modest. When monitoring is imperfect, their
transfers increase by 101% from 3.33 to 6.69, and this di¤erence is signicant at the
5%-level. With perfect monitoring, the increase is smaller (12%) and insignicant, al-
though this is from a relatively high base of 6.28 under individual liability with perfect
monitoring. While theory predicts such a response for relatively risk-tolerant indi-
viduals making high-risk investments, the e¤ect was broadly distributed and suggests
the possibility of a behavioral response.32
It is tempting to interpret increased upside transfers by individuals taking greater
risk as compensation for the default insurance their partners provide, but several other
factors call this interpretation into question. Joint liability increases upside transfers
even for those not taking additional risk. Moreover, when monitoring is imperfect,
transfers do not appear to increase with the amount of risk imposed. Panel A of Figure
5 shows mean transfers made at each payo¤ level. Note that transfers at payo¤ levels
of 180 and above, each of which resulted from investments with potential default
costs, do not di¤er from those made at a payo¤ of 160, the result of a successful
investment in project D, which has no default risk. Transfers are at above 160, even
though the potential cost of default increases with the potential gain.
RESULT 4. Informal insurance transfers are treated like debt; cumulative net trans-
fers received to date are a strong predictor of net transfers made in the current period.
The model presented in Section 2 solved for mutual insurance arrangements with
a restriction to stationary transfers, that is, whenever the same state occurs, the same
net transfer is made independent of past histories. As Kocherlakota (1996) and Ligon,
Thomas, and Worrall (2002) demonstrate, a dynamic limited commitment model may
improve welfare relative to the stationary model by promising additional future pay-
ments to relax incentive compatibility constraints on transfers in the current period.
In practice, such dynamic transfer schemes may be implemented through informal
loans as described in Eswaran and Kotwal (1989), Udry (1994) and Fafchamps and
32The economics literature has largely focused on importance of social capital in supporting lend-
ing arrangements. See, for instance, Karlan (2007), Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner (2006), and
Cassar, Crowley, and Wydick (2007). Two notable exceptions are Ahlin and Townsends (2007)
work in Thailand and Wydicks (1999) in Guatemala, both of which nd that social ties can lower
repayment rates. However, sociological and anthropological case studies explore the possibil-
ity that micronance and group lending in particular may a¤ect social cohesion (e.g., Lont and
Hospes 2004, Fernando 2006, Montgomery 1996).
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Lund (2003).
I test formally for this e¤ect by regressing transfers in each round after the rst on
payo¤s, cumulative net transfers, and the rst period transfers of both individuals:
 it = i + 1yit + 2y it + 
t 1X
t0=1
( it0    it0) + "it, (4)
where  it is the transfer made by individual i in round t, yit is individual is income
in round t, and individual xed e¤ects, i, are included to capture subjectspredis-
position towards making transfers. If transfers are treated as debt to be repaid, we
expect  < 0.
As shown in panel A of Table 10, the coe¢ cient on cumulative net transfers made
is consistently negative ranging from  0:120 to  0:302 and signicant at the 1%-
level. These results imply, for example, that under joint liability with imperfect
monitoring we would expect an individual who received the same payo¤as her partner
and had previously received Rs. 20 of net transfers to make a net transfer of Rs. 5.
4.2 The Impact of Contracts and Monitoring on Risk-Taking
I now turn to the e¤ect of contracts and monitoring on risk-taking behavior. As de-
scribed above, expected prots serve as a proxy for risk-taking and increase monoton-
ically from 40 for the riskless choice, A, to 140 for the riskiest choice, H. Panel B of
Table 4 describes each of the eight project choices.
Figure 3 summarizes risk-taking levels relative to autarky across the contract and
monitoring treatments. The illustrated values are calculated from the simple cell-
means regression
~yit =  +
X
j
jTj + "it, (5)
where ~yit is the expected prot of individual is project choice in round t, and Tj is
an indicator for the contract and monitoring treatment. Table 11 presents the full
results from this estimation.
RESULT 5. Informal insurance does not increase risk-taking.
As shown in the discussion of Prediction 3, constrained-e¢ cient informal insurance
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should increase total risk-taking.33 ;34 However, observed insurance fell well short what
would be required for constrained e¢ ciency, and the e¤ect on risk-taking remains an
empirical question.
Comparing investment choices in the individual liability treatment to those under
autarky provides an immediate test of this response; the individual liability treat-
ment di¤ered from autarky only in that subjects were able to engage in informal
risk-sharing. As is evident from Figure 3, the availability of informal insurance had
little e¤ect on individuals risk-taking behavior. Neither of the individual liability
coe¢ cients from the estimation of (5) are signicant as shown in panel A of Table
11. We can reject at the 5%-level increases of 1.2% and 3.2% in the imperfect and
perfect monitoring treatments.
Given the relatively low levels of informal risk-sharing actually observed, this
outcome is perhaps not surprising. While the experiments were designed such that
the maximum implementable informal risk-sharing arrangement would increase the
optimal contract choice by at least one class (e.g., the optimal contract pair for two
individuals with CRRA utility and  of 0:5 would move from the pair fB;Bg, with
individual payo¤s of 100 or 70 in autarky, to fC;Cg, with individual payo¤s of 140 or
50 under individual liability with informal insurance), the realized levels of informal
insurance support only a small increase in risk-taking.
The availability of informal insurance may also have made risk more salient and
thus discouraged risk-taking. While communication was allowed in all treatments,
participants in autarky treatment rarely spoke to one another. Under individual
liability with informal insurance, participants often discussed their project choices
and occasionally made contingent transfer plans. These discussions typically focused
on what would happen in the event of a bad outcome and, by making this state more
salient, may have discouraged risk-taking.
33As shown in section 2.5, this prediction does not necessarily hold if individuals di¤er substantially
in their risk aversion and the Pareto weight is heavily skewed towards the more risk-averse agent.
Based on preferences calculated from benchmark risk choices, such a reduction would only be possible
in 1.4% of all observations. Observed transfers in these observations are not consistent with a Pareto
weight that substantially favors the more risk-averse agent.
34Using the parameters of the experimental setting, I calculated individualsoptimal investment
choices under autarky and with informal insurance that achieves a payo¤ vector that is Pareto
e¢ cient in the equilibrium set. The numerical results imply that constrained-e¢ cient insurance
should increase risk-taking, as measured by the expected prot of individualsproject choices, by
between Rs. 5 and Rs. 10, or 10% to 20%.
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RESULT 6. With imperfect monitoring, joint liability increases aggregate risk-taking
as more risk-tolerant individuals take signicantly greater risk, relying on their part-
ners to insure against default. Those taking additional risk do not compensate their
partners for this insurance but instead free-ride on the mandatory transfer require-
ment. However, this behavior is sensitive to the monitoring environment. Under
perfect monitoring, joint liability marginally reduces risk-taking relative to individual
liability.
As described in Prediction 4 theory does not make sharp predictions for the e¤ect
of joint liability on investment choice. On one hand, risk-pooling and mandatory
transfers from ones partner encourage risk-taking. On the other hand, the threat of
joint default may induce risk mitigation and reduce risk-taking. Which e¤ect dom-
inates in practice depends on the risk tolerance of both partners, other parameter
values, and the selected equilibrium of the dynamic game. In light of the relatively
larger amount of informal insurance observed in joint liability relative to individual
liability, particularly under perfect monitoring, we would expect greater risk-taking
under joint liability. Under joint liability with imperfect monitoring, we would expect
a more modest increase in risk-taking if individuals are behaving cooperatively; how-
ever, if cooperation breaks down, the free-riding e¤ect described in Section 2 would
dominate.
In the experiment under perfect monitoring, joint liability marginally reduces
risk-taking relative to individual liability. Expected prots fall by 2:8% (1:43). This
result, shown in panel B of Table 11, is consistent with the nding that increased com-
munication between partners tends to decrease risk-taking, but it is not statistically
signicant. Under imperfect monitoring, the e¤ect is reversed. Joint liability in-
creases risk-taking by 3:7% (1:88; p = 0:012) relative to individual liability. However
in neither case is the Wilcoxon rank-sum test signicant; p = 0:204 and p = 0:121.
Within the joint liability contract, the e¤ect of monitoring on risk-taking is pro-
nounced. Imperfect monitoring increases risk-taking by 4:3% (2:17; p = 0:009) rela-
tive to joint liability with perfect monitoring, and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test easily
rejects equivalence (p = 0:001). Large di¤erences in behavior across risk types drives
this increase. Risk-averse individuals respond little to joint liability regardless of the
monitoring structure, while more risk-tolerant individuals take signicantly greater
risk when monitoring is imperfect.
I divide subjects into risk categories based on their choices in the risk benchmark-
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ing games. Approximately 70% of subjects picked one of the safe choices, A through
D, and are categorized as risk averse.The remaining 30% picked choices E through
H and are categorized as risk tolerant.This division corresponds to a coe¢ cient of
risk aversion of 0.44 for individuals with CRRA utility and a wealth of zero.
When monitoring is perfect, joint liability does not appear to a¤ect the investment
choices of risk-averse individuals. In fact, as shown in column 5 of Table 12, they take
less risk than in autarky and their project choices are statistically indistinguishable
from those of risk-averse individuals. This is consistent with Giné, Jakiela, Karlan,
and Morduchs (2009) nding that participants who tend to take risks reduce their
risk-taking when their partners make safer choices.
When monitoring is imperfect, risk-tolerant individuals increase their risk-taking
under the simple joint liability contract. As can be seen in column 1, panel C of Table
12, the mean expected return for risk-tolerant individuals increases by 26% (1:2)
from 51.3 under individual liability to 64.7 under joint liability. A nonparametric
Wilcoxon rank test show this di¤erence is signicant at any conventional level (p <
0:0001).35 Evidence of compensatory transfers is mixed. As discussed above, risk-
tolerant individuals do make larger transfers under joint liability, but two facts call
into question the intent of these transfers. First, as can be seen in panel B of Table
9, this increase appears in both perfect and imperfect monitoring, while increased
risk-taking is only evident when monitoring is imperfect. Second, as shown in Figure
5, there is no discernible di¤erence in transfers by risky individuals who chose projects
just below the potential threshold for default (projects C and D) and those who forced
their partners to insure against default (projects E, F, G and H). One interpretation
of this result is that risk-tolerant individuals increase transfers under joint liability
to compensate their partners for the option value of default insurance even if their
investment choices render this insurance moot. Further experimentation would be
useful to test this hypothesis.
The results in columns 3 and 7 of Table 12 demonstrate a stark di¤erence in the
behavior of pairs from the same kendra. While joint liability with imperfect moni-
toring still induces risk-tolerant types to increase their allocation to the risky asset,
this increase is substantially less than when matched with a partner from a di¤erent
35This result is robust to moving the denition of risk tolerantup or down one risk class. A
fully non-parametric specication for the e¤ect of benchmarked investment choice on risk-taking
under joint liability with limited information shows noticeable break between those who elected a
safechoice in the benchmarking rounds and those who did not.
35
kendra (6.26 vs. 16.20). This e¤ectively eliminates the free-riding phenomenon wit-
nessed in outside-kendra pairs. Under perfect monitoring, risk-tolerant types actually
reduce their allocation to the risky asset. While there are a number of factors that
could be driving this behavior, it is consistent with the fact that for within-kendra
pairs informal insurance under joint liability with perfect monitoring generates trans-
fers closer to those required for constrained e¢ ciency and the observation, discussed
in Prediction 3, that income pooling pushes each agents optimal choice to a point
between their autarkic choices.36
When cooperation breaks down, we expect individuals to take action to discourage
free-riding. The next result shows that explicit approval rights are used ex ante to
reduce risk-taking.
RESULT 7. Explicit approval rights are used to curtail risk-taking under joint liability.
Consistent with Prediction 5, panel C of Table 11 conrms that approval rights are
used to prevent risk-taking ex ante, particularly when monitoring is imperfect. When
monitoring is imperfect, risk-taking in the JLA contract is 6.3% lower than in autarky
and 8.3% lower than under joint liability without explicit approval. Both di¤erences
are signicant at greater than the 1%-level. This e¤ect is concentrated among risk-
tolerant individuals, for whom expected prots fall 22% from 63.8 to 49.9. Risk-averse
individuals also reduce their risk relative to individual or joint liability, but the e¤ect
is more modest and only borderline signicant.
As expected, joint liability creates two potential ine¢ ciencies: free-riding when
the enforcement mechanisms necessary to sustain cooperation are weak and excessive
caution when these mechanisms are strong. The next result turns to one possible
solution: equity-like contracts under which full risk-sharing is enforced by a third-
party.
RESULT 8. Equity increases expected returns relative to other contracts while pro-
ducing the lowest default rates. Under imperfect monitoring, expected prots are 5%
larger than under individual liability and 10% larger than under joint liability with
approval rights. While expected prots are only slightly larger than under joint lia-
bility, the increased willingness to take risk is distributed across individuals and not
the result of risk-tolerant individuals free-riding on their partners.
36Statistical tests of whether changes in risk allocation depend on the risk preferences of ones
partner require a very thin parsing of the data and are inconclusive.
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Third-party enforcement of equal income distribution overcomes much of the com-
mitment problem associated with informal risk-sharing arrangements. When part-
ners have identical preferences, it achieves full insurance. As such, and in line with
Prediction 3, we would expect equity-like contracts to encourage greater risk-taking
than under autarky or contracts where limited commitment reduces the sustainable
amount of insurance.
This result can be seen in Figure 3 and the summary of expected prots by contract
type in Table 11. Formal statistical evidence is provided by the regression described
in (5). Tests for the equivalence of the equity treatment dummy coe¢ cients against
those for individual, joint liability, and joint liability with approval are each signicant
at better than the 5%-level. Wilcoxon tests reject equivalence at better than the 1%-
level in each case. While statistically signicant and practically meaningful, the
di¤erences in risk-taking between equity and individual liability or autarky are less
than we would expect. Numerical simulations based on benchmarked risk-taking
behavior predict expected prots under the equity contract should increase by 10% to
20% relative to autarky. Actual expected prots increase by 2% to 5%, approximately
0.10 to 0.25 standard deviations. Relative to joint liability with approval rights, the
increase in expected prots from equity contracts is more than twice as large, 5%
under perfect monitoring and 10% under imperfect public monitoring.
Panel C of Table 6 reports default rates for each contract, ranging from a high of
4.8% in autarky to 0% under equity. The low default rates are consistent with the
reported rates of most micronance institutions Mahasemam itself reports client
defaults of less than 1% but since the terms of default were set by the experiment, I
focus on relative performance across the contract treatments.37 Default rates follow
the pattern we would expect. Adding informal transfers (moving from autarky to the
individual liability treatment) reduces default rates by two percentage points from
4.83% to 2.80%. Moving from individual to joint liability further reduces default rates
to 1.35%, or 1.51% when approval rights are explicit. Finally, equity generated no
defaults as increased risk was almost always hedged across borrowers, with the worst
possible joint outcome still su¢ cient for loan repayment. Each of the di¤erences in
default rates is signicant at the 5%-level.
While these experiments abstracted from key challenges for implementing equity
contracts, including moral hazard over e¤ort and costly state verication, the results
37Low levels of reported default suggest that willful default is not prevalent.
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are encouraging. Innovative nancial contracts may encourage substantial increases
in the expected returns of micronance-funded projects. However, further research is
required to understand why observed risk-taking under the equity contract remained
below what would be predicted based on individualsbenchmarked risk preferences.
Based on the results of this experiment, exploration of how social factors inuence
decisions under uncertainty could provide important information on how to most
e¤ectively move from the lab to equity-like contracts in the eld.
5 Conclusion
This paper has developed a theory of risk-taking and informal insurance in the pres-
ence of formal nancial contracts designed to answer the questions: How do micro-
nance borrowers choose among risky projects? How do they share risk? How do formal
nancial contracts a¤ect these behaviors? And can the structure of formal nancial
contracts themselves explain in part the limited growth observed in micronance-
funded businesses? To shed further light on these questions, it examined the results
of a lab experiment that captured the key elements of the theory using actual micro-
nance clients in India as subjects. Theory-based experimentation allows us to test
generalizable e¤ects of nancial contracts and to delineate mechanisms that would be
challenging to identify in a full eld setting.
The experiment uncovered a number of interesting results. First, informal insur-
ance falls well short of not only the full risk-sharing benchmark but also the con-
strained optimal insurance arrangement predicted by theory. This calls into question
the use of constrained e¢ ciency as the focal equilibrium selection criteria for informal
sharing arrangements. Exploring alternative selection criteria, such as risk-dominance
in the sense of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) and Carlsson and van Damme (1993), o¤ers
a promising avenue for future research.
Second, joint liability encouraged informal insurance. Upside income transfers,
those not required for loan repayment, were almost twice as large under joint lia-
bility as under individual lending. This result cannot be explained as compensation
for default insurance increased transfers are evident even among those who did not
take additional risk. Joint liability may have increased the perceived social connec-
tion to ones partner, thus moving the equilibrium insurance arrangement towards
constrained e¢ ciency. Or joint liability may have provided a coordination device
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that facilitated implementation of cooperative transfer arrangements. A denitive
explanation is beyond the scope of the available experimental evidence, and further
research is necessary to distinguish social e¤ects, coordination devices, and other
explanations.
Third, the core result supports the motivating conjecture: the structure of existing
micronance contracts themselves may discourage risky but high-expected return
investments. When monitoring was imperfect, joint liability produced signicant free-
riding. Risk-tolerant individuals took substantially greater risk without compensating
their partners for the added insurance burden. Granting approval rights, some form
of which likely exist in practice, eliminated free-riding but also reduced risk-taking
below levels in autarky. The strength of this e¤ect suggests that peer monitoring may
not only reduce ex ante moral hazard but also discourage risk-taking more generally,
regardless of e¢ ciency. Taken together, these ndings provide one explanation for
the lack of demonstrable growth in micronance-funded enterprises.
Finally, equity increased risk-taking and expected returns relative to other nan-
cial contracts, although these increases were less than half what theory would predict
for optimal behavior. At the same time, equity also generated the lowest default
rates. While there are signicant hurdles to implementing such contracts in practice
and further research is required to understand deviations from predicted risk-taking
behavior, these results are encouraging and suggest that equity-like contracts merit
further exploration in the eld.
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Relative expected returns proxy for risk-taking behavior as expected returns increase monotonically in a project's riskiness.  
Plot points represent coefficients on treatment dummies in the regression                                         .
Mean expected returns in autarky equal Rs. 51.2.
Error bars represent one standard deviation.
























Figure 2: Illustration of Joint Liability Static Investment Choice Effects
Best Response Function for Individual B: S=1, R=3, D=1, =0.75, =0.5
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Notes:
(1) Plot points represent coefficients on treatment dummies in the regression
(2) Error bars represent one standard deviation.
(3) Equity transfers exclude mandatory, third-party-enforced transfers.
Figure 4: Mean Transfers by Treatment









































80 100 140 160 180 200 240 280
Round Income
B. Perfect Monitoring




Choice Pair Insurance 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
{A,A} 0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     
{B,B} 15     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     
{C,C} 45     0     0     4     16     26     36     43     45     
{D,D} 60     5     21     42     60     60     60     60     60     
{E,E} 75     61     72     75     75     75     75     75     75     
{F,F} 90     67     79     90     90     90     90     90     90     
{G,G} 115     81     97     115     115     115     115     115     115     
{H,H} 140     96     115     138     140     140     140     140     140     
Note: Maximum incentive compatible transfer from agent with successful project in state {h,l }, i.e., one 
project succeeds and one fails, based on equal Pareto weights and homogeneous preferences.  Reflects 
dynamic borrowing incentives with discount rate of 33%, individual liability debt contracts, and no 
additional formal financial contracts.
Table 2: Maximium Sustainable Transfers
Transfer when outcome is {h,l }
CRRA risk aversion index ()
A. AUTARKY
Choice Pair 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
{A,A} 23.9  18.9  15.2  12.6  10.9  10.1  10.5  14.5  
{B,B} 26.0  20.3  16.1  13.2  11.3  10.3  10.6  14.6  
{C,C} 28.8  21.5  16.5  13.2  11.0  10.0  10.2  14.2  
{D,D} 28.8  20.4  14.7  11.0  8.5  7.0  6.5  8.1  
{E,E} 13.0  9.1  6.5  4.7  3.6  2.9  2.7  3.3  
{F,F} 14.5  10.0  7.0  5.1  3.8  3.1  2.8  3.3  
{G,G} 17.3  11.7  8.0  5.7  4.2  3.3  2.9  3.4  
{H,H} 20.1  13.2  8.9  6.2  4.5  3.5  3.0  3.5  
B. FULL INSURANCE
Choice Pair 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
{A,A} 23.9  18.9  15.2  12.6  10.9  10.1  10.5  14.5  
{B,B} 26.2  20.4  16.2  13.3  11.4  10.4  10.7  14.6  
{C,C} 29.8  22.6  17.5  14.0  11.7  10.5  10.7  14.6  
{D,D} 30.9  22.7  17.1  13.2  10.7  9.2  8.9  11.6  
{E,E} 19.4  14.1  10.4  8.0  6.4  5.4  5.2  6.7  
{F,F} 21.0  15.1  11.1  8.4  6.6  5.6  5.3  6.7  
{G,G} 24.9  17.5  12.6  9.3  7.2  5.9  5.5  6.9  
{H,H} 28.5  19.7  13.9  10.1  7.7  6.3  5.7  7.0  
C. MAXIMUM SUSTAINABLE TRANSFERS
Choice Pair 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
{A,A} 23.9  18.9  15.2  12.6  10.9  10.1  10.5  14.5  
{B,B} 26.0  20.3  16.1  13.2  11.3  10.3  10.6  14.6  
{C,C} 28.8  21.5  16.7  13.7  11.6  10.5  10.7  14.6  
{D,D} 29.5  22.1  17.0  13.2  10.7  9.2  8.9  11.6  
{E,E} 19.3  14.1  10.4  8.0  6.4  5.4  5.2  6.7  
{F,F} 20.9  15.1  11.1  8.4  6.6  5.6  5.3  6.7  
{G,G} 24.7  17.4  12.6  9.3  7.2  5.9  5.5  6.9  
{H,H} 28.3  19.6  13.9  10.1  7.7  6.3  5.7  7.0  
Note: Bold and boxed amount represents maximum per period utility along column.  Maximum incentive compatible transfer from 
agent with successful project in state {h,l }, i.e., one project succeeds and one fails, based on equal Pareto weights and homogeneous 
preferences.  Reflects dynamic borrowing incentives with discount rate of 33%, individual liability debt contracts, and no additional 
formal contracts.  Full insurance reflects equal sharing of all income.
CRRA risk aversion index ()
Table 3: Average Per Period Utility for Different Transfer Regimes
CRRA risk aversion index ()
CRRA risk aversion index ()
A. BENCHMARKING GAME
Expected
Choice White (High) Black (Low) Round Profit
A 40       40       40.0       1.76 to ∞ 
B 60       30       45.0       0.81 to 1.76
C 70       25       47.5       0.57 to 0.81
D 80       20       50.0       0.44 to 0.57
E 90       15       52.5       0.34 to 0.44
F 100       10       55.0       0.26 to 0.34
G 110       5       57.5       0.17 to 0.26
H 120       0       60.0       −∞ to 0.17
B. CORE GAMES (all include debt repayment)
Expected
Choice White (High) Black (Low) Round Profit (1)
A 80       80       40.0       6.2 to ∞ 3.9 to ∞ 
B 100       70       45.0       0.59 to 6.20 1.0 to 3.9
C 140       50       55.0       0.57 to 1.0
D 160       40       60.0       −∞ to 0.57
E 180       30       70.0       
F 200       20       80.0       
G 240       10       100.0       
H 280       0       120.0       −∞ to 0.59
Notes:
(1) After debt repayment of Rs. 40.
(2) Assumes wealth level of zero.
(3) Continuation probability equals 75%.  Default round income equals zero.
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-----         
Table 4: Summary of Investment Choices
-----         
-----         
Single Shot
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-----         
Dynamic(3)
Implied Risk






Session     Date Rounds Participants
Participants in 
larger kendra
1    11/30/2006 5      24      12      
2    11/30/2006 9      23      12      
3    11/30/2006 12      16      9      
4    11/30/2006 7      20      11      
5    11/30/2006 6      14      7      
6    11/30/2006 11      8      8      
7    11/30/2006 9      22      12      
8    11/30/2006 12      10      10      
9    11/30/2006 7      21      11      
10    11/30/2006 9      21      11      
11    11/30/2006 7      20      10      
12    11/30/2006 10      18      10      
13    11/30/2006 12      15      10      
14    11/30/2006 11      20      10      
15    11/30/2006 10      20      10      
16    11/30/2006 15      20      11      
17    11/30/2006 11      17      10      
18    11/30/2006 14      17      10      
19    11/30/2006 11      23      12      
20    11/30/2006 10      24      12      
21    11/30/2006 11      17      10      
22    11/30/2006 9      20      10      
23    11/30/2006 10      20      10      
24    11/30/2006 13      20      10      
B. OBSERVATION COUNTS BY GAME
Game Perfect Imperfect Total
Benchmarking --    --    341      
Autarky --    --    768      
Individual liability 420      520      940      
Joint Liability 352      336      688      
Joint liability with partner approval 172      110      282      
Equity 318      106      424      
Monitoring
Table 5: Session Detail
Diff
Perfect Imperfect Total Perf.-Imp.
(1) (2) (3) (4)




Individual Liability 50.33 51.46 50.96 1.13
(9.71) (13.81) (12.17) {0.169}
[396] [498] [894]
Joint Liability 52.20 50.03 51.13 -2.17
(11.85) (11.56) (11.75) {0.017}
[338] [330] [668]
Joint Liability w/ Partner Approval 47.88 50.14 48.81 2.25
(8.37) (9.63) (8.96) {0.044}
[156] [108] [264]
Equity 52.82 52.45 52.72 -0.36
(14.09) (10.70) (13.25) {0.810}
[284] [104] [388]
B. TRANSFERS
Individual Liability 2.42 5.83 4.32 3.41
(6.24) (10.94) (9.31) {0.000}
[396] [498] [894]
Joint Liability 5.58 7.39 6.47 1.82
(13.41) (11.27) (12.42) {0.059}
[338] [330] [668]
Joint Liability w/ Partner Approval 4.36 8.43 6.02 4.07
(6.81) (7.93) (7.55) {0.000}
[156] [108] [264]
Equity(3) 3.82 4.90 4.11 1.08






In perfect monitoring treatment, all actions and payments are observable.  In imperfect monitoring treatment, all partner's actions are 
unobservable.  Players are informed only if partner earned enough to repay her debt, Rs. 40.
Table 6: Summary Statistics
Monitoring(2)
Excludes mandatory, third-party enforced transfers.
Standard deviations in parentheses.  Observation counts in brackets.  Panels A-C exclude observations where the effective game 
differs from the randomly assigned treatment (e.g., after one partner defaults under individual liability, the surviving partner is 
effectively playing in autarky). p-value of difference in braces.
Diff
Perfect Imperfect Total Perf.-Imp.





Individual Liability 2.27% 3.21% 2.80% 0.94%
(0.15) (0.18) (0.16) {0.398}
[396] [498] [894]
Joint Liability 1.48% 1.21% 1.35% -0.27%
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12) {0.762}
[337] [330] [667]
Joint Liability w/ Partner Approval 1.28% 1.83% 1.51% 0.55%
(0.11) (0.13) (0.12) {0.718}
[156] [109] [265]
Equity 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) - -
[284] [104] [388]




Individual Liability 49.74 48.37 48.98 -1.37
(37.82) (37.92) (37.86) {0.586}
[409] [510] [919]
Joint Liability 52.39 49.03 50.75 -3.35
(41.87) (32.42) (37.56) {0.242}
[352] [336] [688]
Joint Liability w/ Partner Approval(3) 41.10 54.18 46.21 13.08
(27.96) (38.69) (33.12) {0.001}
[172] [110] [282]
Equity(3) 48.77 40.96 46.68 -7.81






In perfect monitoring treatment, all actions and payments are observable.  In imperfect monitoring treatment, all partner's actions are 
unobservable.  Players are informed only if partner earned enough to repay her debt, Rs. 40.
The project success rate for full risk sharing treatment in the perfect and imperfect monitoring settings was 37.1% and 46.9%.  The 
project success rate for joint liability with partner approval was 57.9%.  All equal 50% in expectation.  
Table 6: Summary Statistics (cont)
Monitoring(2)
Standard deviations in parentheses.  Observation counts in brackets.  Panels A-C exclude observations where the effective game 
differs from the randomly assigned treatment (e.g., after one partner defaults under individual liability, the surviving partner is 
effectively playing in autarky). p-value of difference in braces.
Imperfect Perfect(3) Imperfect Perfect(3) Imperfect Perfect(3) Imperfect Perfect(3) Imperfect Perfect(3) Imperfect Perfect(3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Individual Liability
Net transfers 1.3 3.6 2.8 6.8 2.1 3.6 3.5 6.1 1.1 3.5 2.5 7.0
Full risk-sharing transfer 19.1 20.3 30.6 36.5 18.6 20.2 27.4 36.3 19.3 20.4 32.0 36.6
Net as % of full sharing 6.9% 17.5% 9.2% 18.7% 11.3% 17.9% 12.8% 16.7% 5.5% 17.4% 7.8% 19.2%
Constrained-efficient transfer (CET)(4) 7.8 6.6 16.5 17.6 8.2 6.2 14.6 15.3 7.6 6.7 17.4 18.2
Net as % of CET 17.0% 53.8% 17.0% 38.8% 25.6% 57.9% 24.0% 39.5% 13.9% 52.9% 14.3% 38.7%
Joint Liability
Net transfers 3.2 5.3 5.8 9.9 3.1 6.8 6.1 11.6 3.3 4.7 5.4 9.1
Full risk-sharing transfer 25.4 19.6 37.0 34.2 22.6 24.1 32.9 40.9 29.0 17.8 41.8 30.9
Net as % of full sharing 12.5% 27.2% 15.5% 29.0% 13.5% 28.2% 18.5% 28.3% 11.4% 26.7% 12.9% 29.4%
Constrained-efficient transfer (CET)(4) 10.7 7.3 20.5 17.2 9.9 10.7 20.8 20.6 11.8 6.0 20.1 15.5
Net as % of CET 29.5% 73.0% 28.1% 57.8% 30.8% 63.6% 29.3% 56.2% 28.0% 79.4% 26.7% 58.8%
Joint Liability with Approval
Net transfers -0.3 1.3 2.1 1.7 1.1 1.0 2.5 1.7 -1.4 1.4 1.7 1.7
Full risk-sharing transfer 14.9 19.0 27.4 32.2 15.6 19.0 24.7 31.7 14.3 19.0 30.0 32.5
Net as % of full sharing -1.7% 6.8% 7.6% 5.2% 7.1% 5.3% 10.1% 5.3% -10.0% 7.4% 5.6% 5.1%
Constrained-efficient transfer (CET)(4) 4.5 5.6 9.6 10.7 2.4 14.3 4.8 22.6 6.0 2.4 14.4 4.7






Table 7: Net Transfers as Percentage of Full Transfers(1)
Net transfers equal transfers from partner with higher income minus transfers from partner with lower income.  In the even of equal income, player with lower id number arbitrarily treated as having "higher" income.
In perfect monitoring treatment, all actions and payments are observable.  In imperfect monitoring treatment, all partner's actions are unobservable.  Players are informed only if partner earned enough to repay her debt, Rs. 40.
Conditional on exactly 
one success(2)
Monitoring Monitoring
Full risk sharing transfer equals (own payoff - partner's payoff)/2.  Constrained-efficient transfer calculated via numerical simulation based on individuals' CRRA risk aversion parameter estimated from benchmark risk aversion experiment, actual 
project choices for each subject pair, and a static transfer arrangement with Pareto weight equal to the ratio of agents' marginal utilities in state hh  under autarky.  If no such transfer satisfies both agents' participation constraint, the Pareto weight 
nearest to the autarkic ratio and supporting individually rational participation is used.
Corresponds to states hl  and lh , as described in the text.
Same Kendra Different Kendra
Monitoring









Different Same Same Kendra Different Same Same Kendra Different Same Same Kendra
All Kendra Kendra Effect All Kendra Kendra Effect All Kendra Kendra Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
A. TRANSFERS(2)
Individual liability 2.42*** 2.50*** 2.21**  -0.29      5.83*** 5.98*** 5.21*** -0.76      -3.41*** -3.48*** -3.01**  0.47      
(0.44)     (0.40)     (0.90)     (0.86)     (0.59)     (0.68)     (1.02)     (1.20)     (0.75)     (0.81)     (1.37)     (1.47)     
Joint liability 5.58*** 8.68**  3.16*** -5.52      7.39*** 7.33*** 7.55*** 0.22      -1.82      1.35      -4.40*** -5.75      
(1.79)     (3.63)     (0.65)     (3.54)     (0.88)     (1.13)     (1.24)     (1.67)     (1.99)     (3.79)     (1.40)     (3.91)     
Joint liability w/ approval 4.36*** 4.52*** 4.17*** -0.36      8.43*** 7.88*** 9.83*** 1.95      -4.07*** -3.36**  -5.67*** -2.31      
(0.64)     (0.98)     (0.79)     (1.25)     (1.01)     (1.37)     (0.84)     (1.61)     (1.14)     (1.59)     (1.15)     (1.99)     
Equity(2) 3.82*** 3.17*** 4.40*** 1.23      4.90*** 2.90*** 7.86*** 4.95*** -1.08      0.27      -3.46*** -3.73**  
(0.65)     (0.64)     (0.90)     (0.90)     (0.78)     (0.95)     (0.77)     (1.22)     (0.89)     (1.12)     (1.20)     (1.71)     
B. UPSIDE TRANSFERS(2)
Individual liability 3.21*** 3.72*** 2.64*** -1.08      6.70*** 8.09*** 6.92*** -1.17      -3.49*** -4.37*** -4.28**  0.09      
(0.59)     (0.70)     (0.94)     (0.97)     (0.89)     (1.27)     (1.59)     (1.99)     (1.07)     (1.46)     (1.84)     (2.15)     
Joint liability 7.06*** 12.97**  4.50*** -8.47*    9.65*** 10.28*** 12.32*** 2.04      -2.58      2.70      -7.81*** -10.51*    
(2.55)     (5.30)     (1.18)     (5.14)     (1.19)     (1.67)     (2.04)     (2.68)     (2.79)     (5.54)     (2.36)     (5.79)     
Joint liability w/ approval 4.70*** 6.36*** 5.29*** -1.08      9.27*** 9.86*** 9.71*** -0.16      -4.57*** -3.50      -4.42*** -0.92      
(1.00)     (1.68)     (1.24)     (2.09)     (0.92)     (1.66)     (1.03)     (1.95)     (1.32)     (2.32)     (1.61)     (2.87)     
Notes:
(1)
(2) Excludes mandatory, third-party enforced transfers.  Upside transfers denote transfers from an individual when her project succeeds, excluding debt repayment assistance.
(3)
Table 8: Effect of Contract Type & Kendra Type on Transfers
OLS Regression of Transfers on Treatment & Kendra Match Dummies
Individual clustered standard errors in parenthses.  * denotes significance at the 10%, ** at the 5%, and *** at the 1% level.
Imperfect Monitoring(1)
In perfect monitoring treatment, all actions and payments are observable.  In imperfect monitoring treatment, all partner's actions are unobservable.  Players are informed only if partner earned enough to repay her debt, Rs. 40.
Difference (Imperfect-Perfect Monitoring)Perfect Monitoring(1)





Individual liability 3.21      6.70      -3.49***
(0.35)     (0.85)     (0.92)     
Joint liability 7.06      9.65      -2.58      
(0.82)     (2.59)     (2.72)     
Joint liability w/ approval 4.70      9.27      -4.57***
(0.35)     (1.37)     (1.41)     
Difference: Joint - Individual 3.85*** 2.94      
(0.90)     (2.53)     
B.  RISK TOLERANT SUBJECTS
Individual liability 2.77      4.59      -1.82      
(0.81)     (0.92)     (1.23)     
Joint liability 9.09      10.63      -1.53      
(4.97)     (4.10)     (6.44)     
Joint liability w/ approval 6.36      9.50      -3.14      
(2.06)     (0.29)     (2.08)     
Difference: Joint - Individual 6.32      6.03      
(4.84)     (4.18)     
C. RISK AVERSE SUBJECTS
Individual liability 3.33      6.28      -2.95*    
(0.29)     (1.74)     (1.77)     
Joint liability 6.69      7.05      -0.36      
(0.98)     (3.22)     (3.37)     
Joint liability w/ approval 4.20      10.14      -5.94***
(0.32)     (0.82)     (0.88)     
Difference: Joint - Individual 3.36*** 0.77      




(3) Risk tolerant and risk averse classifications based on benchmark risk experiments
Table 9: Effect of Contract Type & Monitoring on Upside Sharing
Transfers When Project Suceeds, Excluding Debt Repayment Assistance
In perfect monitoring treatment, all actions and payments are observable.  In imperfect monitoring treatment, all 
partner's actions are unobservable.  Players are informed only if partner earned enough to repay her debt, Rs. 40.
Standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses. * Denotes significance at the 10%-level, ** at the 5%-
level, and *** at the 1% level.
UpsideTransferi j j ij T  
Imperfect Perfect Imperfect Perfect Imperfect Perfect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Transfers
Own income (1) 0.033*** 0.059*** 0.048*** 0.108*** 0.040**  0.009      
(0.006)     (0.008)     (0.009)     (0.021)     (0.017)     (0.066)     
Partner's income (2) -0.009      -0.006      -0.025**  -0.028*** -0.013      -0.024      
(0.011)     (0.015)     (0.010)     (0.008)     (0.009)     (0.063)     
Cumulative net transfers () -0.120*** -0.186*    -0.247*** -0.189*** -0.302*** -0.162***
(0.029)     (0.101)     (0.092)     (0.024)     (0.001)     (0.005)     
Observations 396      498      338      330      156      108      
R 2 0.41      0.59      0.75      0.65      0.64      0.64      
Mean transfers 2.42      5.83      5.58      7.39      4.36      8.43      
Notes:
(1)
(2) In perfect monitoring treatment, all actions and payments are observable.  In imperfect monitoring treatment, all partner's actions are unobservable.  
Players are informed only if partner earned enough to repay her debt, Rs. 40.
Table 10: Determinants of Transfer Behavior
Individual Liability Joint Liabilty Joint Liabilty w/ App.
Standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses.  Includes individual fixed effects. * Denotes significance at the 10%-level, ** at the 5%-





Individual liability -0.83      0.30      -1.13      
(0.94)     (1.18)     (1.22)     
Joint liability 1.05      -1.13      2.17***
(0.83)     (1.17)     (0.76)     
Joint liability w/ approval -3.27*** -1.02      -2.25*    
(1.03)     (1.55)     (1.39)     
Equity 1.66      1.29      0.36      
(2.86)     (1.28)     (1.81)     
B. TREATMENT EFFECTS RELATIVE TO JOINT LIABILITY
Individual -1.88*** 1.43      
(0.69)     (1.40)     
Joint liability w/ approval -4.32*** 0.11      
(0.73)     (1.40)     
Equity 0.61      2.42***
(2.58)     (0.85)     
C. TREATMENT EFFECTS RELATIVE TO JOINT LIABILITY w/ APPROVAL
Individual 2.44*** 1.32      
(0.46)     (1.93)     
Equity 4.93**  2.31      




Table 11: Effect of Contract Type & Monitoring on Risk Taking
OLS Regression of Expected Profits on Treatment Dummies
Omitted Category: autkary;  Mean expected profits: 51.2
In perfect monitoring treatment, all actions and payments are observable.  In imperfect monitoring treatment, all 
partner's actions are unobservable.  Players are informed only if partner earned enough to repay her debt, Rs. 40.
Standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses.  * Denotes significance at the 10%-level, ** at the 5%-
level, and *** at the 1% level.
ProjProfiti j j ij T    
Different Same Same Kendra Different Same Same Kendra Different Same Same Kendra
All Kendra Kendra Effect All Kendra Kendra Effect All Kendra Kendra Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
A. ALL RISK TYPES
Individual liability -0.83      -0.94      -0.52      0.42      0.30      0.30      0.28      -0.02      -1.13      -1.24      -0.80      0.44      
(0.90)     (0.99)     (1.46)     (1.56)     (0.83)     (0.88)     (1.95)     (2.07)     (1.12)     (1.23)     (2.40)     (2.59)     
Joint liability 1.05      2.63      -0.18      -2.81      -1.13      -1.94**  0.92      2.86*    2.17      4.57*    -1.10      -5.67*    
(1.19)     (2.31)     (1.02)     (2.55)     (0.87)     (0.95)     (1.53)     (1.69)     (1.45)     (2.57)     (1.75)     (3.11)     
Joint liability w/ approval -3.27*** -2.76*    -3.87*** -1.10      -1.02      -0.97      -1.16      -0.19      -2.25      -1.80      -2.71**  -0.91      
(1.02)     (1.64)     (0.93)     (1.78)     (1.32)     (1.79)     (1.02)     (2.07)     (1.68)     (2.55)     (1.19)     (2.86)     
Equity(2) 1.66      0.97      2.28      1.31      1.29      0.86      1.94      1.08      0.36      0.11      0.34      0.23      
(1.24)     (1.57)     (1.73)     (2.21)     (1.23)     (1.36)     (2.28)     (2.65)     (1.25)     (1.96)     (2.59)     (3.70)     
B. RISK-AVERSE TYPES(4)
Individual liability 0.07      0.14      -0.12      -0.27      -0.04      0.07      -0.93      -1.00      0.11      0.08      0.81      0.73      
(1.14)     (1.28)     (1.57)     (1.67)     (1.33)     (1.28)     (3.32)     (3.00)     (1.51)     (1.61)     (3.52)     (3.48)     
Joint liability -0.54      -1.04      -0.25      0.79      -0.81      -1.21      0.86      2.07      0.27      0.17      -1.11      -1.28      
(1.06)     (1.34)     (1.23)     (1.45)     (1.37)     (1.55)     (1.56)     (1.92)     (1.46)     (1.86)     (1.64)     (2.44)     
Joint liability w/ approval -2.58      -1.90      -5.51*** -3.61      -0.80      -1.33      0.02      1.35      -1.78      -0.56      -5.53*** -4.97      
(1.77)     (2.11)     (1.66)     (2.43)     (1.79)     (2.86)     (1.32)     (3.27)     (2.66)     (3.87)     (1.73)     (4.26)     
Equity(2) 2.91*    2.57      3.32      0.75      1.32      2.32      -0.68      -3.00      1.59      0.25      4.00      3.75      
(1.74)     (2.23)     (2.41)     (3.08)     (1.92)     (2.36)     (2.78)     (3.47)     (1.73)     (3.14)     (3.43)     (5.75)     
C. RISK-TOLERANT TYPES(4)
Individual liability -1.37      -2.04      1.60      3.64      0.47      1.41      -3.09      -4.50      -1.84      -3.45      4.69      8.14      
(2.22)     (2.13)     (4.97)     (4.69)     (1.95)     (1.98)     (3.46)     (3.50)     (2.45)     (2.52)     (5.51)     (5.83)     
Joint liability 12.10*** 16.20*** 6.26*** -9.94**  -2.84      -2.10      -4.72**  -2.63      14.94*** 18.30*** 10.98*** -7.32      
(2.93)     (3.43)     (1.89)     (4.28)     (1.84)     (2.14)     (2.26)     (2.55)     (4.03)     (4.52)     (2.39)     (4.82)     
Joint liability w/ approval -2.84      -3.94*    -1.02      2.92      -0.41      0.55      -3.69**  -4.24      -2.43      -4.49      2.67      7.15      
(1.78)     (2.13)     (2.38)     (2.69)     (3.59)     (4.73)     (1.51)     (4.67)     (3.77)     (5.05)     (1.82)     (5.14)     
Equity(2) 0.15      -3.19      6.81      10.00      4.81*    2.31      6.20**  3.89      -4.67      -5.50      0.61      6.11      
(4.66)     (3.14)     (8.39)     (7.37)     (2.49)     (3.63)     (2.43)     (3.44)     (3.79)     (3.57)     (7.83)     (10.23)     
Notes:
(1)
(2) Excludes mandatory, third-party enforced transfers.  Upside transfers denote transfers when project succeeds, excluding debt repayment assistance.
(3)
(4) Risk type based on investment choices in benchmarking rounds.  
Table 12: Effect of Contract Type & Kendra Type on Risk-taking
OLS Regression of Risk-taking on Treatment & Kendra Match Dummies, by Risk Type
In perfect monitoring treatment, all actions and payments are observable.  In imperfect monitoring treatment, all partner's actions are unobservable.  Players are informed only if partner earned enough to repay her debt, Rs. 40.
Omitted Category: autkary;  Mean expected profits: 51.2
Individual clustered standard errors in parenthses.  * denotes significance at the 10%, ** at the 5%, and *** at the 1% level.
Imperfect Monitoring(1) Perfect Monitoring(1) Difference (Imperfect-Perfect Monitoring)
ProjProfiti j j ij T    
A Proofs and Derivations
A.1 Autarkic Investment Choice
In autarky (individual liability with no informal transfers), an individuals single-
period investment choice problem solves
max

U(;D) = u[yh(;D) D] + (1  )u[maxfyl() D; 0g]: (6)
Because of the discontinuity created by limited liability, this problem does not have
a niceclosed form solution for , the optimal allocation to the risky investment.
With the constant relative risk aversion utility function, u(c) = c(1 )=(1   ), the
rst order condition for an interior maximum is:
INT =
(z   1)[S(1 +D) D]








Accounting for the discontinuity created by limited liability, the optimal allocation is
 =

INT ; if EU(

INT ) > EU(1)
1; otherwise
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In the dynamic problem, individuals solve
max

V (;Dt) = EfU() + V (;Dt)g,




1   Pr[Rj] ,
where Pr[Rj] is the probability that the individual meets the repayment terms of
the individual liability loan conditional on investment choice .
A.2 Discussion of Predictions
As described in Section 2.3, note that  represents the Pareto weight placed on agent
B.








Denition 2 (relative marginal utility) For any state of nature  2 fhh; hl; lh; llg
and transfer arrangement T = f gS, let (T ) = u0(yA    )=u0(yB +  ).
Where not required for clarity, I will drop the argument and refer to (T ) simply
as . Note that the rst-best insurance arrangement involves full income pooling,
 = , a constant, 8. Under individual liability with no transfers (T = 0), the
autarky treatment, the rst-order conditions for optimal investment allocation require
(R  S)u0(yhi ) = (1  )Su0(yli), which implies that hh(0) = ll(0).
Lemma 1 places some structure on the relative marginal utilities, , generated
by any transfer arrangement generating a payo¤ vector that is constrained e¢ cient
in the set of equilibrium payo¤s.
Lemma 1 (properties of ) For any transfer arrangement, T = (hh; hl;  lh;  ll);
generating a payo¤ vector that is constrained e¢ cient in the set of equilibrium payo¤s:
1. hl  lh;
2. If hl = , then hh = . Similarly, if lh = , then ll = ;
3. If there exist  and 0 such that  > 
0
then hl < lh.
Note that this implies that an individual is weakly better o¤ when her project
succeeds and her partners fails than when her project fails and her partners succeeds.
















. But since yhli > y
lh
i , there exists a ^ 2 ( lh; hl) such
















: This transfer arrangement increases expected utility
for both agents, a violation of Pareto optimality. For the second part, suppose
hl =  > hh. This implies that As incentive compatibility constraint does not
bind in hh. Therefore, there exists T 00 = (hh + d ; hl   d u0(yhhB +hh)
(1 )u0(yhlB +hl)
;  lh;  ll)
that satises the incentive compatibility constraints and leaves Bs expected utility
unchanged. But hl > hh implies that VA(; T 00) > VA(; T ), a violation of Pareto
optimality. A similar argument shows that lh =  implies ll = . The third part
of the lemma follows immediately.
Lemma 2 (transfers when exactly one project succeeds) For any non-zero
transfer arrangement, transfers will be made in states where one risky project suc-
ceeds and the other fails,  2 fhl; lhg, and the agent whose project succeeds will make
a transfer to the agent whose project fails. That is, if T 6= 0, then hl > 0 >  lh.
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This lemma captures the intuition that if individuals make any transfers, they will
do so in the states where the utility cost to make the transfer is the lowest and the
benet to receiving a transfer is the highest.
Proof. If T 6= 0, then Vi(; T ) > Vi(; 0) for both agents. If hl  0 then 9  6= hl




hl)  uB(yB+ ) and u0B(yhB+hl)  u0B(yB+ ). Similarly, uA(ylA hl) >
uA(y

A    ) and u0A(yhA   hl) < u0A(yA    ). Therefore, 9 "; k > 0 such that for
T 0 with hl0 = hl + " and  0 =     k" that is incentive compatible and increases
expected utility for both agents, contradicting Pareto optimality. Therefore hl > 0.
The same reasoning serves to prove  lh < 0.
Lemma 3 (symmetric optimal investment) For any transfer arrangement gen-
erating a payo¤ vector that is constrained e¢ cient in the set of equilibrium payo¤s




Proof. If full insurance transfers are implementable, then the individual maximiza-
tions with respect to investment allocation also maximize joint surplus. For any
combined allocation to the risky asset,   (A+B)=2, we can solve for the individ-
ual allocation that maximizes total utility. The rst order condition for this problem
requires that both agents have the same marginal utility of income after transfers















BR + (2  2)S   ~ylhB

. Both equations are satised if and only if A = B.
Discussion of Prediction 1 (information and informal insurance).
Consider a transfer arrangement generating a payo¤ vector that is con-
strained e¢ cient in the set of equilibrium payo¤s under perfect monitoring, T  =
(hh; hl;  lh;  ll), where each element   denotes the transfer from A to B in state .
As incentive compatibility constraint in state hl can be written as
u(yh   hl)  u(yh)  
n
~V (e; T )  ~V (p; 0)
o
, (8)
where ~V (e; T ) equals the expected continuation utility of investment choice e and
transfer arrangement T , which equals Vi(e; T )=(1  Pr[Rije; T ]) with, as dened in
Section 2.3, Pr[Rije; T ] the probability that individual i meets the repayment terms
of her formal nancial contract conditional on investment choice e and transfer
arrangement T and Vi(e; T ) agent is expected per-period utility with investment
choice e and transfer arrangement T .
With imperfect public monitoring, each player knows only her own outcome at the
time of making her transfer and her partners outcome is never revealed. We restrict
individualstransfers under imperfect public monitoring to pure strategies: each will
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choose a strategy T
0





















B), and the superscript denotes




A T 0B. Because transfers can
no longer be conditioned on the other players realization, a transfer arrangement T 
can be replicated if and only if hh  lh = hl  ll.39 The proof proceeds by showing
that for all potentially replicable transfer arrangements, the incentive compatibility
constraint is more restrictive under imperfect public monitoring. First, note that
for any h >  l to be feasible, an individual who transfers  l must be punished with
some positive probability p. I assume that this punishment takes the same form as
that of the perfect monitoring: reversion to the minimum transfer prole.
~V (e; T 0) is the expected continuation value of the transfer prole T 0. Thus the
incentive compatibility constraint when individual As investment is successful is
u(yhA   hA + hB) + (1  )u(yhA   hA +  lB) +  ~V (e; T 0)  u(yh) +  ~V (p; 0):
Without loss of generality, consider a transfer arrangement, T , under perfect moni-
toring, where hh  0 and set  lB to 0.40 As incentive compatibility constraint for
hA = 
hl is
(1  )u(yhA   hA)  u(yh)  u(yhA   hA + hB) + 
n
~V (e; T )  ~V (p; 0)
o
:
By the non-negativity of hh, this implies




~V (e; T )  ~V (p; 0)
o
Therefore under imperfect public monitoring the maximum implementable trans-








~V (e; T )  ~V (p; 0)
o
~V (e; T 0)  (1  ) ~V (e; T ) + ~V (p; 0): (9)
In order to evaluate this inequality, we need to determine ~V (e; T 0), the continu-
ation value of the imperfect public monitoring game:
~V (e; T 0) =
U(e; T 0) + p^ ~V (p; 0)
1  (1  p^) ; (10)
39For example, the symmetric transfer arrangement T = (0;  ;  ; 0) can be replicated under
limited information by players adopting the strategies T 0A = ( + k;  + k; k; k) and T
0
B = ( +
k; k;  + k; k).
40Note that hh must be non-negative for at least one of the agents.
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where p^ is the probability that either player receives the low draw (and therefore
makes the low transfer) and is punished, and U(e; T
0
) is the per-period expected
utility of investment choice e and transfer arrangement T 0. The probability that a
given player has the low draw and is punished is (1 )p, therefore the probability that
both players avoid punishment is (1 p+p)2 and p^ = 1  (1 p+p)2. Combining
equations (9) and (10) provides the condition that the maximum sustainable transfer
under imperfect public monitoring is greater than or equal to that under perfect
monitoring only if
U(e; T 0) + p^ ~V (p; 0)
1  (1  p^) 
(1  )U(e; T 0)
1   + 
~V (p; 0) (11)
(1  ) ~V (p; 0)  U(e; T 0)
However, note that for any positive transfer to be feasible, U(e; T 0) > (1  
) ~V (p; 0), that is, in expectation the transfer arrangement must generate at least as
much utility as the minimum transfer prole. Equation (11) implies an immediate
contradiction, therefore transfers under the imperfect public monitoring are weakly
less than those under perfect monitoring and strictly so if transfers are positive and
the incentive compatibility constraint is binding under perfect monitoring.
Discussion of Prediction 2 (joint liability and informal insurance). This
prediction describes the four e¤ects of joint liability (mandatory transfers) on the
maximum incentive compatible insurance arrangement. For illustration, rst, con-
sider the case where individual A does not take default risk but her partner does.
Here, ~VA(; T ) under joint liability is strictly less than ~VA(; 0) under individual lia-
bility. She must occasionally make but never receives such transfers. This relaxes
her incentive compatibility constraint in (2) relative to (1). Furthermore, in states
where transfers are contractually required (hl and ll), required transfers reduce the
scope for deviation, u(yA    ). For any T , her incentive compatibility constraints
are relaxed and she will be willing to make weakly greater transfers in each state of
the world. However, the situation is reversed for her partner. For her, ~VB(; T )
under joint liability is greater than ~VB(; 0) under individual liability. Since    0
for all  and the incentive compatibility constraint in (2) unambiguously tightens.
The net e¤ect is ambiguous.
Now, suppose both individuals take default risk. For expositional simplicity, I
restrict attention to investment allocations where total income is insu¢ cient to repay
both loans in states hl and lh, however, the results extend with minor modications
to cases where this does not hold. Here, ~VA(; T ) under joint liability is greater than
















1  :When the required transfers are relatively low, the probability of
success is high, and the discount factor (and hence the value of being able to repay and
reborrow) is high, the expected utility of making only those transfers required by joint
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liability exceeds that of autarky. If this condition holds for both individuals, joint
liability reduces the maximum incentive compatible transfer in state hh. Turning
to transfers in states hl and lh, we must account for the fact that the mandatory
transfer limits the scope for deviation. Here, ~VA(; T ) under joint liability is greater










precise criteria o¤ers little insight, the implications are similar to those above, but the
parameter space over which the maximum implementable transfers are smaller under
joint liability than under individual liability is further restricted. In all states, the
net e¤ect of joint liability on the set of implementable informal insurance transfers
depends on the parameter values.
Discussion of Prediction 3 (informal insurance and risk taking).
For the rst part of the prediction if transfers are made only when exactly one
risky project succeeds, then both individualsallocations to the risky asset are greater
than under an RPBE without transfers note rst that from lemma 2, hl > 0 >  lh.
Without loss of generality consider individual As investment choice problem. In
autarky, the optimal investment choice requires (R   S)u0((R   S) + S)   (1  
)Su0((1 )S) = 0. For any transfer arrangement, T = (0; hl;  lh; 0), the rst order
condition for optimality evaluated at (0) is 2(R S)u0((R S)+S hh)+(1 
)f(R S)u0((R S)+S hl) Su0((1 )S  lh)g (1 )2Su0((1 )S  ll) > 0.
Therefore (T ) > (0):
For the second part of the prediction, assume A  B, that is, B is weakly more
risk averse than A. From lemma 3 we know that if T achieves full insurance, then
A(T ) = 

B(T ). Full insurance requires that 
 =  8, therefore  ll > 0 > hh.
Intuitively, the more risk-tolerant party, A, is insuring her partner by making transfers
in the jointly low state (ll) and receiving payment in the jointly high state (hh). As
above, I evaluate each individuals rst-order condition for optimal investment at the
autarkic optimum. For individual B, the partial of each term evaluated at B(0) is
positive, therefore B will unambiguously allocate more to the risky asset for an RPBE
with T 6= 0 than for one with T = 0. For agent A, however, the e¤ect of transfers
in states hl and lh is positive, but the e¤ect of hh and  ll is negative, tending to
reduce As optimal allocation to the risky asset relative to autarky. The relative size
of these e¤ects depends on the parameters and the net impact is ambiguous.
Finally, I show that the combined e¤ect of full insurance is to increase total risk-
taking. Following lemma 3, if insurance is complete, then both agents allocate the
same amount to the risky asset. If their combined allocation to the risky asset is




B(0))=2  (0): This implies that total income
in states hh and ll is the same as in autarky and total income is the same in states
hl and lh. Full insurance requires  =  8, which implies that (i) ~yhhi  ~yhli =
~ylhi  ~ylli 8i and (ii) (R   S)u0i(~yhhi ) = S(1   )u0i(~ylli ), i.e., transfers in states
hh and ll recover the autarkic distribution of income. Now we can evaluate the
rst-order condition for optimal investment at i (T ) = (0), which I rewrite as
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i(i; T )  2(R S)u0i(~yhhi )+(1 )f(R S)u0i(~yhli ) Su0i(~ylhi )g (1 )2Su0i(~ylli ) = 0.
Next, I show that for all possible values of R, S and , i((0); T ) > 0. First, if
R  2S and   1
2





rewrite i(i; T ) = (2 1)(R S)u0i(~yhhi )+(R 2S)(1 )u0i(~yhli ) > 0. Therefore, if
i(T ) = (0) both individuals will allocate more to the risky asset and hence the total
allocation to the risky asset will increase. If  < 1
2
, we use the fact that ~yhhi  ~yhli ,
therefore i(i; T )  (2R+R 3S)u0i(~yhhi ) > 0, and the total allocation to the risky
asset will be larger than under autarky. Finally, if   1
2
and R < 2S, we substitute
for u0(~yhhi ) from (ii) and i(i; T ) = (2 1)(1 )Su0(~ylli )+(R 2S)(1 )u0(~yhli ) >
(2 1)(1 )Su0(~ylli )+(R 2S)(1 )u0(~ylli ) = (1 )(R S)u0(~ylli ) > 0, and again
the total allocation to the risky asset will be larger than without informal insurance.
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